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I. UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
INTRODUCTION
What does a democratic government look like? Countless scholars, politicians, and
leaders have tried to define it, and countless others have tried to export or transplant democracy
to countries they consider to be undemocratic. U.S. policy makers, among others in Western
countries, assume that this form of government is not only the best form of government, but that
it is universally desirable. Since its founding, the United States has believed that its liberal
democracy, with a representative and divided government, as well as free trade and the
protection of personal property rights, to be exemplary. We believe that we are unique: a shining
city on the hill—an example for the rest of the world to follow. Historically, this phenomenon is
known as American Exceptionalism.1 In fact, at various times, we have sought to both maintain
and export our particular democratic practices so that others could follow our example. Thus,
when it comes to democracy, the United States attempts to export its values because it believes it
is exceptional. Yet time and time again, policy makers who seek to export democracy are met
with disappointment and criticism. If in the future, the United States decides it again wants to
pursue democratization abroad, it is necessary for policy makers to modify their practices, as
recent attempts at democratization, most relevantly to this thesis in Haiti and Iraq, have only
produced failures.
Haiti and Iraq were chosen as the case studies for this project for several reasons. First,
they represent two military interventions to promote democracy in modern history that came to
be viewed as the central foreign policy initiatives of two U.S. presidents, only to end in disaster
years down the road. Second, both efforts occurred as the world was entering a new era after the
1

	
  

Alexis de Tocqueville. 2003. Democracy in America. London [u.a.]: Penguin books. p. 36.
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end of the Cold War, giving U.S. policy makers unique opportunities to craft new foreign policy
strategies. Finally, these two Presidents, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, who initiated
these interventions, represent the two major political parties that have endured in the United
States for hundreds of years. These cases of military intervention are significant then, because
they demonstrate continuity between Democratic and Republican administrations: regardless of
party, democratization is an ongoing pillar of U.S. foreign policy—it is not a partisan issue.
Thus, in the study of U.S. democratization efforts, Haiti and Iraq are important cases for
understanding U.S. policy makers’ failures to export successful models of democracy.
For the purposes of this thesis, I analyze the events in Haiti between 1991 and 1997 (the
year the United Nations ended its mission in Haiti) and the events in Iraq between 2003 and 2006
(the year in which the United States backed Maliki as Iraq’s Prime Minister). These dates were
chosen not only because they encompass the duration of each intervention, but also because they
provide perspectives on the damage done after each democratization project was prematurely
labeled a “success.” In the Haiti case, success was announced upon Aristide’s return to his
country in 1994, whereas in the Iraq case, success was announced upon the transfer of
governance from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Iraq in 2004. Both military interventions
began with US-led invasions to topple the current regime, hoping to secure democracy by force,
and both ended in disaster. Despite these bookended similarities, the context for each case was
very different, not to mention the geographic, cultural, economic, and political distinctions
between the two. President Clinton, in attempting to stem the flow of drugs and refugees from a
deteriorating Haiti while simultaneously balancing American ideals to maintain democracy and
human rights around the world was backed into a corner by his own promises, and had no
political choice but to invade. President Bush, on the other hand, had promised a war on terror
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and the protection of the United States’ oil resources, as well as the promotion of democracy
around the world, and delivered this promise in the form of a war on Iraq. One key similarity
between these two cases, however, is the confidence of the United States that it would not only
be simple to export democracy to a foreign country, but also universally welcomed. Furthermore,
both cases exemplify the now widely discredited notion that conducting elections is synonymous
with constructing democracy. Years later, these two countries are still grappling with the effects
of the United States’ destructive decisions. So how is it that between two different
administrations, opposing political parties, and ten years, similar mistakes were made? The
important question I ask in this study is: in the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to
implement democracy in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, where did the democracy planners go
wrong in their democratization efforts, and how did these mistakes further each country’s failure
to democratize successfully?
In order to understand these failures, we must begin by examining our understanding of
democracy, and why, despite years of accumulated knowledge and presumably the best
intentions, our aspirations for democratization continue to defy the timelines of many democracy
planners, as well as the hopes of the states they attempt to democratize.2 This disconnect between
the blueprints for democratization and the results of its implementation should lead one to define
democracy more carefully. If U.S. foreign policy makers believe it is possible to model and
export democracy, we must thoroughly define the characteristics of a working and sustainable
democracy so we know the ways in which to assist in creating change in the future. By
recognizing what democracy planners misinterpreted in their endeavors, we can modify practices

2

Throughout this thesis, when referencing democracy, I am referring to the system of government,
whereas when referencing democratization, I mean the practice of transitioning to a democratic political
regime. In the case of Haiti and Iraq, this act of democratization occurred externally through the United
States’ invasion of both countries.
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of democratization for the future, should it ever be attempted again. Here, I am not advocating
for such actions. Rather, I am suggesting that if a future administration pursues democratization
abroad, it must be conducted with greater understanding of democracy, and fundamentally
different implementation practices so that the United States does not wreak havoc in yet another
state.
The definitions of democracy should inform the blueprints for democratization.
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, it is important to engage in the intellectual endeavor of
illuminating previous scholarship on democracy and democratization because it is necessary to
make clear what U.S. policy makers should be trying to achieve as well as the characteristics by
which we can evaluate the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to export democracy to
Haiti and Iraq. As a result of the findings in this study, I argue that due to an inadequate
understanding of the universal characteristics of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s
historical, political, and social contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to
democracy (including competing incentives for the invasion), the Clinton and Bush
administrations both failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, and in fact left each
country worse-off than it was before the United States’ involvement. Furthermore, these two
examples suggest that the very practice of externally motivated and enforced democratization
cannot lead to a sustainable democracy, unless policy practices are significantly modified in the
future. Even though these countries are geographically, economically, and culturally very
different, the Clinton and Bush administrations made similar mistakes in democracy planning in
each, making the question of defining democracy and its relationship to democratization
absolutely essential in any possible future endeavor.
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This thesis proceeds in the following manner: The subsequent theoretical section
identifies and expands upon several post-WWII democracy and democratization theories, chosen
due to their significance and their representation of the field as a whole, and frequency of citation
by other scholars of democracy. This selection includes theories of democracy, democratization,
and transitional governments from authors such as Robert Dahl, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan,
Seymour Lipset, Robert Putnam, Joseph Schumpeter, Arend Lijphart, and Samuel Huntington.
According to available citation analysis metrics, Linz and Stepan, Lipset, Lijphart, Dahl, and
Huntington’s most popular publications have been cited over 10,000 times each, with some cited
up to approximately 45,000 times.3 Putnam and Schumpeter’s title works in this thesis have been
cited approximately 37,000 times alone, not including their other popular publications.4
Moreover, these authors have all been published in top tier journals in the field of political
science according to the impact factor (h-index) of each journal. Thus, even decades later,
political scholars and policy makers alike still see them as the benchmarks of democratization
studies. In addition to this, I also bring in contemporary work done by authors such as Laurence
Whitehead, Thomas Carothers, and Fareed Zakaria to represent the more recent trajectory of the
academic field. These authors are by no means a complete selection, but for the purposes of this
3

“Google Scholar Citation Search: Linz and Stepan,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Linz+and+Stepan&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36&oq=Linz+and
+, cited 13,519 times; “Google Scholar Citation Search: Seymour Lipset,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=+Lipset&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited 17,374 times;
“Google Scholar Citation Search: Arend Lijphart,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Lijphart&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited 19,746 times;
“Google Scholar Citation Search: Robert Dahl,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,36&q=author:Robert+author:Dahl, cited 30, 473
times; “Google Scholar Citation Search: Samuel Huntington,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Samuel+Huntington&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36, cited
45,123 times.
4
“Google Scholar Citation Search: Robert Putnam,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Me4t2sQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, cited 37,213 times; “Google
Scholar Citation Search: Joseph Schumpeter,” last modified March 31, 2017,
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eiol1dkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, cited 37,971 times.
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paper, they most effectively communicate a nuanced understanding of democracy and
democratization. Next, I will apply the characteristics of democratic structures identified in the
literature review to Haiti and Iraq in order to evaluate the military interventions in the two
countries. To do this, I will provide an analytical structure differentiating the identified
democratic characteristics into three categories. These three categories (Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of Democracy, and Obstacles to
Democracy) serve as the framework by which I consider each country.
With Haiti, first I will examine the conditions in the country prior to the invasion, then
look at the claims the democracy planners made regarding their democratization plans. Then, I
analyze what actually occurred, followed by an explication of the aftermath. The chapter on Iraq
will mirror in sequence the discussion of Haiti’s failed democratization. Finally, I will offer a
comparison of the two cases together, thinking about what these patterns can tell us about
democracy planning for the future. By building on the democracy theorists that I discuss,
presenting new categories with which to evaluate democratization efforts, and closely assessing
the United States’ failure to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, this paper will contribute to
the literature on democracy and democratization and offer lasting lessons for policy makers to
take into consideration, should the United States (for better or for worse) continue to undertake
such endeavors.
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WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?
In his seminal work, On Democracy, Robert Dahl traces the history of democratic
societies over 2,500 years, and comes to the conclusion that effective democracies, no matter
how varied, require a common set of fundamental standards.5 Dahl believes that democracy can
be preserved and advanced, although there are key differences between an ideal and actual
democracy. Ideal democracy relies on theoretical ideas and values that Dahl views are implicit in
any democracy, which are not easily quantifiable. Actual or functional democracy, on the other
hand, relies on key political institutions within the governing body of the state. In explaining
ideal democracy, Dahl gives us five basic characteristics that every democracy must have. First,
there must be equal and effective participation. Second, there must be voting equality. Third,
there must be enlightened understanding. By this Dahl means that within reasonable time limits,
each member of society must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about the
government’s policies and subsequent consequences. Fourth, there must be control of the
agenda: the members of the political society must have the exclusive opportunity to decide what
matters are to be placed on the agenda. Fifth, there must be an inclusion of adults. While the list
of characteristics for an ideal democracy is rather theoretical, as explained previously, Dahl’s list
of fundamental necessities for a large, functional democracy is more specific, and recognizes the
critical importance of institutions within a democracy.
To understand the working democracy, we first need to decode what Dahl means when
he says that political institutions are absolutely necessary in order to maintain a functional
democracy. Dahl defines institutions as democratic arrangements, which gradually become
practices, and then finally settle into institutions. Thus, the following institutions are required in
order to achieve democratic goals: a large, successful democracy demands the practice of free,
5

	
  

Robert A. Dahl. On Democracy. New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 1998.
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fair, and frequent elections leading to elected officials, sustained freedom of expression,
alternative sources of information (the media), associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship.
Although the first three qualifications are fairly self-explanatory, the last two deserve further
clarification. Dahl’s definition of associational autonomy is the right to form relatively
independent associations or organizations within a civil society, such as political parties or other
activist groups. Following that, inclusive citizenship requires that no adult subject to a state’s
laws can be denied the rights that are afforded to all citizens and are necessary to the political
institutions listed previously. To accomplish these practices, the creation of a legitimate and
lasting constitution is paramount. Dahl goes on to divide characteristics for a large functional
democracy between those that are necessary, and those that will further the endeavor of
democratization, but are not absolutely essential to the creation of the democracy itself.
Dahl’s characteristics that he claims are necessary for democratization to occur include
control of the military and police by elected officials, a democratic political culture, and finally
that there be no strong foreign control hostile to democracy. While the first and third are clearer
goals to attain, creating a society that views democracy positively and exists in a similar political
culture implies that the subgroups within civil society all view the democratic government and
the political institutions that sustain them in an analogous way. Some, like Dahl and Huntington,
have argued that a fairly homogenous society (Japan, for example) in terms of culture, religion,
and ethnicity may be necessary for successful democratization, while others, such as Linz,
Stepan, and Lipset, contend that successful democratization may only require common
democratic values held by all citizens.
These criteria lead us to Dahl’s favorable characteristics for democracy: a modern market
economy and weak sub cultural pluralism within civil society. The latter condition brings us to a
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key point of debate in the literature on democracy and democratization. Do different cultures
matter when constructing a democracy? In terms of their citizens’ views on democracy, Dahl
seems to believe that similar views on democracy are required. He goes on, however, to address
this question of diverse culture by citing examples (US, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, and
Canada) in which democracies have succeeded despite their social cleavages. This leads Dahl to
the conclusion that the success of states with deep social cleavages depends upon the state
fulfilling the remaining categories associated with democracy, such as a democratic political
culture, free and fair elections, and sustain freedom of expression, to name a few. Therefore, in
countries where all other conditions are favorable to democracy, the challenge of having a
diverse citizenship can be more easily managed.
Although Dahl skillfully presents a comprehensive list of qualifications for institutional
practices within a functional democracy, as well as criteria for what is needed or wanted in that
successful democracy, a critique of his work—including that by Huntington, whom I discuss
later—is that while he examines democracy, he does not adequately emphasize the importance of
economic development. In other words, he does not address the concerns of those who argue that
economic development is absolutely necessary if a state wishes to democratize. When discussing
the conditions that are favorable for democracy, Dahl does not categorize a modern market
economy as a necessity to democracy, only as favorable characteristic. In addition to this, when
advocating for a somewhat homogenous society in terms of culture, political beliefs, and
attitudes towards democracy, Dahl does not address other differences that occur within society,
such as income inequality, reinforcing the previous criticism of Dahl’s lack of emphasis on the
developmental issues for a new democracy.
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Arend Lijphart, rather than placing social cleavages in a category that will most likely be
detrimental to democracy, argues that they can be leveraged effectively in a system of
Consociational Democracy, which unites fractured states for a common political goal.6 As
opposed to Dahl’s individualized recipe for democracy, Lijphart champions the idea of group
rights. The central tenets of consociationalism are government by grand coalition—essentially a
cartel of elites—and segmental autonomy. The grand coalition governs the state as a whole while
representing the segments of society that are culturally, ethnically, or religiously divided. By
looking at Northern European states, Lijphart found that a once fractured state, when confronted
with a common enemy, could unite to create multiple balances of power among the existing
subcultures. Therefore, consociationalism is born from the relationship between political culture,
social structure, and political stability.
Typically, political stability depends on overlapping group membership within a
society—by this he means that the segments of society we divide ourselves into have some
fluidity in membership. However, in consociationalism, this is not a requirement. Lijphart
suggests that when confronted with an external threat, a grand coalition forms to prevent the
fragmentation of the state into hostile subcultures. With a grand coalition, the cabinet includes
extra parties so that it can represent the views of a broader portion of the public, and a minority
veto system to ensure that all groups are represented equally. In a contentious society with
clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, a grand coalition government
sidesteps many of the problems that would surface in a majority-rule form of government. He
concludes that for consociational democracy to succeed, there first must be a government by
coalition, a second element of segmental authority, a proportional electoral system, and finally a
6

	
  

Arend Lijphart. “Consociational Democracy” World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jan., 1969), pp. 207-225
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mutual veto for the protection of minority interests. More than this, the consociational
democracy must satisfy the following requirements: first, the elites must have the ability to
accommodate divergent interests of subcultures. Second, the elites must have the ability to
transcend cleavages. Third, the elites must have a commitment to the maintenance and survival
of the system, and finally there must be an understanding of the perils of political fragmentation.
If we recall Dahl’s qualifications for democracy, Lijphart’s set looks quite different. This system
of government profoundly contrasts with the majority-rule ideal of Dahl’s democracy, and is
often viewed as controversial because it exists on the basis of deep social cleavages, ranging
from ideology and religion to ethnicity and language, and prioritizes the treatment of groups as a
whole over one’s individual equality within society.
Lijphart, like Dahl, lists for us a series of favorable conditions that correspond with
consociational democracy. Unlike a traditional democracy, a multiple balance of power and a
multi-party system among the segments of a plural society are more favorable than a dual
balance of power, i.e. a two-party system.7 In addition to this, Lijphart’s research suggests that
smaller countries adapt to consociational democracy more favorably than large countries. For
example, the largest country he studied was the Netherlands, which had a population of less than
12 million in 1960. As Haiti’s current population is about 10.3 million people, this characteristic
bolsters Haiti’s candidacy for consociational democracy. Iraq, however, has a population of
about 33 million, but possesses a pluralistic, fractured society much closer to the kind that
Lijphart describes than that of Haiti. Nonetheless, both the internal and external characteristics of
small countries are beneficial for consociational democracy in different ways: internally, elites
are more likely to know each other and meet often, whereas externally, small countries are more
7

Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: a comparative exploration (New Haven: Yale
Universtity Press, 1977), 55.
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likely to feel threatened by their neighbors, reinforcing the concept that when presented with an
external threat, the segments of society will unite to create a grand coalition government.
Therefore, it would be difficult to assume that group-based consociational democracy can
flourish anywhere—like individual-based liberal democracy, there are certain conditions that
appear to be necessary for its success.
With a nuanced understanding of Lijphart and Dahl’s theories of individual and groupbased democracies, we can now examine Samuel Huntington’s more economically driven
consideration of democratization in order to broaden our scope of how to best evaluate attempts
at democracy. In Huntington’s The Third Wave, he explains that if a given country lacks certain
favorable internal conditions, it is unlikely to democratize, even in the snowballing third wave of
democracy, which he claims began in the 1970s.8 Relying on Schumpeter’s procedural definition
of democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions—i.e. democracy
cannot exist without political parties and without elections—Huntington outlines various
obstacles to democracy.9 Huntington believes these obstacles include: virtual absence of
experience with functional democracy, leaders of authoritarian regimes, absence of commitment
to democratic values among political leaders, certain non-western cultures that are particularly
hostile to democracy, lack of economic development, and finally, poverty. While Huntington
believes that Islam and Confucianism are particularly hostile to democracy, it is important to
note that Indonesia, which hosts millions of Muslims, maintains a functional democracy,
pointing to the fact that there is nothing endemic to Islam that is inherently anti-democratic.
Unlike Dahl, Huntington believes that when it comes to democratization, political
leadership and economic advancement are the most important indicators of success, as he
8

Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, Harper and Row: 1942),
283.

9
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believes they are the most critical to a state’s health. The ability to fund institution building is
necessary if one is to attempt democracy building. He reminds us, however, that even though an
overall correlation exists between levels of economic development and democracy, no level of
economic development alone can bring about democratization. Along with the people in the
state, the political leaders must believe that liberal democracy is the best and only option. This
departure represents a larger divide between theorists who either believe that democracy or
development must come first when pursuing democratization. Fareed Zakaria, who will be
discussed later in this section, feels similarly to Huntington: good governance and equal
distribution of goods are essential to a functioning democracy.
Although Huntington believes in the power and importance of elections, as evidenced by
his “two-turnover test,” he understands that defining democracy in terms of elections alone is
limiting, and must be balanced with other criteria, such as those Dahl puts forth.10 Unlike the
previous authors, Huntington cautions us to remember that when evaluating a democracy, the
stability of the system in question differs from the very nature of the system itself. In other
words: democracy planners must remember that when exporting democracy, even if every
criterion we have seen listed was in place, democracy would not flourish unless the government
in question had stability as well. For Huntington, stability—or the state’s level of
institutionalization—and its security apparatus go hand in hand. The greater the levels of
violence within governmental transitions, the harder it is to successfully democratize. Security,
just like any governmental institution, helps ensure the longevity and stability of the government
in question.

10

In The Third Wave, Huntington posits that the true test of a successful transition to democracy is when
an incumbent part is voted out office, followed by its successor, without a collapse in the democratic
constitutional order.
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While Huntington is concerned with stability, theorists Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, in
their work The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, are primarily concerned with the legitimacy,
efficacy, and effectiveness of a government in order to maintain democratic practices.11 Like the
previous authors discussed, Linz and Stepan have their own criteria in defining democracy, but
as we have now come to expect, their definition differs slightly from what we have seen before.
Linz and Stepan argue that a democracy can be defined by the following: legal freedom to
formulate and advocate political alternatives, freedom of association, speech, and other basic
freedoms of person, free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of
those leaders’ claim to rule (elections), inclusion of all effective political offices in the
democratic process, provision for the participation of all members of society, and the freedom to
create political parties and conduct free and honest elections. These criteria suggest a balance of
institutional necessities as well as the more basic values that we associate with ideal democracy.
Linz and Stepan seem not only to be considering democracy conceptually and all that it entails,
but also the conditions of the country itself along with its civil society that helps to establish its
government. Much like the theorists previously discussed, they work to enhance our idealized
understanding of liberal, individual democracy and the values that it assumes, while
simultaneously considering its more difficult and pragmatic institutional needs.
Additionally, Linz and Stepan are also concerned with dissecting how to maintain a
democracy, rather than just how to create one. They focus on the concept of legitimacy as
defined by Max Weber: if a political regime is legitimate, it means that its participants have
certain beliefs or faith in regard to it, which are based on either legal, traditional, or charismatic

11	
  Juan

Linz and Alfred Stepan. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited by Linz, Juan J., Alfred
C. Stepan. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
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authority.12 Accordingly, they find that legitimacy is either granted or withdrawn by each
member of society, and that only the passing of time, or a charismatic leader can reinforce
democratic institutions in their stages of infancy. Efficacy is judged as the sum of a
government’s actions over a long period of time, and is heavily influenced by comparisons to
other state’s functions. Finally, the effectiveness of the government in question can either work
to forward the legitimacy of the democracy or it can quickly cause its population to lose faith,
and thus reduce legitimacy. Linz and Stepan provide a counter-balance to Huntington’s
assurances that security and stability ensure a democracy’s survival: while it is difficult to define
and understand what brings about legitimacy, even the most stable and secure state will
eventually fail without it. Political parties return as a recurring theme for these two as well,
however they complicate the idea of political parties by suggesting that an opposition party, if it
works outside the rules and norms of the new democracy, can be a force of destabilization and
crisis. If we can recall from Huntington and Schumpeter, a representational party system leads to
the most stable kind of democracy because it allows for organized opposition and healthy change
that is reflective of the will of the people within the state as whole. However, if subsequent
parties attempt to overthrow the system and bypass the rules and norms of the democracy, which
are created by the political institutions put in place, the results will likely be destructive.
Seymour Martin Lipset, with liberal use of Alexis de Tocqueville and Schattschneider,
argues passionately for the indispensability of political parties in keeping with his
democratization colleagues.13 He maintains that the conflict between the governing and
opposition parties helps to establish democratic norms and rules. Therefore, a stable democracy

12	
  Max

Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (Talcott Parsons (ed.), New York: Free
Press, 1964), 382.
13
Seymour M. Lipset “The Indispensability of Political Parties,” Journal of Democracy 11.1 (2000): 4855.
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requires a supportive culture, the rights of the opposition, free speech and assembly, rule of law,
regular elections, and turnover in elected office. Again, we have this slippery category of
needing a supportive culture, or similar views on democracy in order to embrace the state’s new
government. For democracy planners, this perhaps suggests an intimate knowledge of the state’s
political, social, and historical contexts before any attempts at democratization can be made. It is
important to note that a stable democracy also requires a flexible time line—one that
acknowledges the often-lengthy endeavor of institutionalizing democracy. Although none of the
authors discussed (except Whitehead) mentions the concept of time directly, they all
acknowledge that effective, legitimate, and stable institutions grow slowly. Lipset is the first of
the authors discussed to really stress not only the importance of the rule of law, but also the
necessity of a legitimate opposition party. Without an opposition party, a democracy can quickly
turn into a dictatorship. The core of democracy thrives on debate—it would follow that on a
larger scale, the institution could not survive without at least two strong, oppositional parties.
The two-party system, however, must be supported by the norms and practices of the
government in question, and viewed with legitimacy by the state’s citizens.
Furthermore, Lipset pays significant attention to considering democracy from a
sociological and behavioral standpoint.14 Like Linz and Stepan, Lipset places importance on the
relationship between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the political system. As there are so
many differing cases, with so many nuanced and complex historical contexts, he suggests that
academics cannot simply say that there is one set of social conditions (income, urbanization, and
education levels) that are regularly associated with any kind of political system. This is why it is
absolutely critical to examine each country and discern its unique characteristics before
14

Seymour M. Lipset “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), 69-105.
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attempting democratization. After cautioning democracy planners not to oversimplify, Lipset
finds—much like his contemporaries—there are general trends that demonstrate what a
democracy engenders. Democracies tend to have higher per-capita incomes, a higher degree of
urbanization, a higher degree of education, and the ability to create voluntary organizations that
further civil society. Huntington, of the development-first school, would endorse his
assessments.15 According to Lipset, democracy requires a supportive culture (here, he is in
agreement with Dahl and others), and newer democracies must be rapidly institutionalized,
consolidated, and legitimized. To do this, he suggests that a strong civil society is required.
Here it is necessary to flesh out what civil society means within the context of
democratization, and to discuss the benefits of its strengths or weakness. To talk about the
importance of a strong civil society is to talk about Robert Putnam and his work on the
significance of social capital.16 Comparing northern and southern Italy, Putnam et al survey the
institutional performance of regional governments and find that in northern Italy, where citizens
participate actively in sports clubs, literary guilds, and choral societies, the governments are
more democratic. On the other hand, in southern Italy, where patterns of civil engagement are
weak, the regional governments tend toward a hierarchy that lacks accountability and no systems
in place for feedback, which in turn breed corruption and inefficiency. Putnam concludes by
labeling these networks and norms of reciprocity within civil society as “social capital,” and
argues that they positively impact functional governance because trust is engendered between the
people and the state. In short: strong social capital is indicative of a strong civil society and
institutional performance, which as we know is essential to a functional democracy.
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So far we have seen that even between such different forms of democracy as posited by
Dahl and Lijphart, governmental institutions are required to maintain legitimacy and stability,
and civil society must be allowed to organize independently from the government itself for a
state to be considered democratic in any sense. Fareed Zakaria, however, suggests that while
democracy might be flourishing, constitutional liberalism is not.17 Zakaria states that
constitutional liberalism is not about the procedures and institutions in place for selecting
government, but rather about the government’s goals and ideals. It encompasses the individual’s
liberty and autonomy, which rests on tradition and rule of law. Labeling a country democratic
neither ensures democratic practices, nor does it guarantee liberal constitutionalism. He suggests
that we need to worry about what happens after elections because democracy as the equivalent of
good governance loses sight of the defense to an individual’s right to life, property, freedom,
religion, and speech. As mentioned earlier, Zakaria also believes that economic development
furthers the likelihood of a young democracy’s success. The United States, however, is so eager
to legitimize and centralize young democracies above all else, that it has lost sight of liberal
democracy. For Zakaria, a strong constitutional government is essential for a successful
transition to democracy. If constitutional liberalism is forgotten, democracy becomes nothing but
“a quaint exercise in rule-making.”18 Instead of putting forth criteria for successful democracy
and strategies for democratization, Zakaria chooses to define the problem by taking a closer look
at what the international community has settled for labeling its so-called democracies. He asserts
that without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of a democracy in a
divided society only leads to nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.
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Additionally, when writing in light of the Iraq War, Zakaria discusses the concept of
militarized democratization as it relates to implementing and exporting democracy abroad,
essentially positing the idea that versions of militarized democratization will not work for the
developing world.19 By militarized democratization, he means the military endeavor to invade a
country, and then democratize it by force, disregarding the will of the people for the assumption
that the entire world believes democracy to be the best form of government. In the United States’
efforts to advance its visions of liberal democracy, free trade, and protection of personal property
rights around the world, administrations are too quick to call a state democratic and to agree with
Fukuyama’s claim that the West has won. If a state claims that it has successfully democratized,
but acts more like a dictatorship or autocracy, the United States should not be labeling it as a
democracy. Overall, Zakaria has a less positive outlook on the possibilities of democratization
than his contemporaries. However, he does not rule it out completely—democracy planners
simply have to be aware that when they are chasing democracy, they must be on the lookout for
liberal constitutionalism as well. Without it, these transplanted, young “democracies” will be
democratic in name alone.
Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment adds to the debate on democratization by
examining the process of creating a democracy from an aid-driven standpoint.20 He contends that
while the rhetoric regarding democracy promotion is far more hopeful than its less-consistent
policy reality, progress has indeed been made (he refers to this as the “learning curve”) and
therefore the endeavor of supporting burgeoning democracies should not be ignored. Carothers
considers cases that were mainly monetarily based, as opposed to the addition of military
intervention seen in Haiti and Iraq, and finds that while democracy cannot be exported like a
19
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commodity, it does not grow from within without outside influence. By this, he means that the
forces of globalization make it impossible for a transitioning country to avoid outside impact or
modeling. He also asks his readers to remember that democracy promotion does not require
perfection from the promoters (i.e. the United States). When critiquing the act of externally
assisting transitioning countries with monetary aid, he states that the greatest problems involve a
lack of local ownership over the programs in addition to a lack of flexibility in a too-short time
frame. He reaffirms other scholars who agree that democracy programs cannot be one-size fits
all, and suggests that we move beyond institutional modeling, wherein a country attempts to
reproduce the forms of institutions seen in an already established democracy.
Finally, Laurence Whitehead contends that democracy is best understood as an openended engagement with flexible parameters and no clear finish line.21 His view on democracy
and democratization somewhat goes against what this paper has previously discussed, because he
views democratization not as something that can ever be achieved, but as something that is
always an ongoing process. So what is there to be done if democracy has no strict rules and no
clear end point? He suggests that if democratization theory is to be examined at all in light of
contemporary experience, states must approach transplanting democracies abroad with the notion
that to insist on a set of standardized outcomes regardless of context would be both historically
and culturally insensitive. The definition of democracy should remain contestable simply
because all worthwhile conceptions of this form of government must incorporate in some
capacity the ability for a legitimate opposition to challenge the governing authority. Are there
better recipes for success? Whitehead does not provide us with a clear answer. As Whitehead
focuses more on challenging the act of democratization than any of the previous authors
21
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discussed, it is more profitable to consider why he takes issue with the act of transplanting
democracy than to list and analyze his criteria for democracy. Despite our sophisticated
understandings of democracy as studied over the years by Dahl and his contemporaries,
Whitehead asserts that the act of transplanting democracy cannot be achieved unless it is
considered as an ongoing process with no end point in sight.
When it comes to the act of democratization, Whitehead firmly believes that the “two
turnover test” posited by Huntington is not enough to test whether or not a country has fully
democratized, because it assumes that democratization ends after two successful elections.22 He
complicates the validity of this test by asking whether or not the United States was democratic
before it abolished slavery—if we hold it up to liberal constitutional values of democracy such as
Zakaria champions, and even those of Dahl’s ideal democracy, it most certainly was not. Thus,
when it comes to democratization, the timeline that democracy planners anticipate is extremely
important. It is necessary to have a nuanced understanding of democracy because if we use an
incorrect definition, the act of democratization incorrectly becomes a set of clear, quick, and
formulated choices that have a rational construction ending in closure in every situation. The
people around the table making decisions matter, and a charismatic leader can pull a country
together, but seeking short-term stability as if it was democracy is only going to end in crisis and
fragmentation. Finally, as Whitehead states, if a contemporary process of democratization is
correctly identified as long-term and open-ended, then the analyst or democracy planner cannot
know with certainty what the eventual outcome will be.
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STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS:
APPLYING UNDERSTANDINGS OF DEMOCRACY TO HAITI AND IRAQ
While it is necessary to gain a nuanced understanding of the theoretical literature on
democracy and democratization in order to accurately evaluate what went wrong in Haiti and
Iraq, it would be insufficient to discuss these theories without further distilling how they can be
used to understand real world situations. This section provides an analytical framework to do so.
Lijphart, while important to understand in the canon of literature on democracy, was largely
rejected by populations who felt that consociational democracy would exacerbate religious and
cultural divides. Thus, as the United States was not interested in Lijphart’s consociational
democracy, its characteristics, intrinsic contexts, and obstacles will not be considered within this
framework. It is important to remember, however, that there is more than one kind of democracy,
despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s lack of interest in a power-sharing scheme. When
synthesizing the theorists that were just discussed, we can illuminate some common themes: all
except Lijphart have a commitment to liberal, individual democracy. These democracies are
characterized by free, fair, and frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the
creation of a constitution, an autonomous civil society, and legitimate political parties. Along
with these characteristics, the theorists—Huntington, Lipset, Dahl, and Zakaria, in particular—
are careful to remind their readers of the obstacles to democracy as well: lack of commitment to
democratic ideals, insufficient economic development, lack of stability, and an absence of
experience in democracy, to name a few. Beyond the requirements and obstacles, however, we
can see a third category come to light: the intrinsic and already existing historical, cultural,
political, and socioeconomic conditions of a country and how these contexts affect its hopes to
democratize.
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As there appears to be more to the study of democratization than simply checking off a
laundry list of commonly understood characteristics of democracy, this paper extracts from the
previous theory discussion three categories by which to evaluate and examine the United States’
failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq. The three categories are as follows: first, the
Characteristics Associated with Democracy that are dependent on a state’s historical, cultural,
political, and socioeconomic contexts (I will label these as internal characteristics), second, the
Universal Characteristics of Democracy independent from a state’s internal traits, and third, the
Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization that arise, in combination, from a country’s
existing conditions and from objective qualities that would be harmful to any democracy around
the world. These analytic categories and their criteria are represented in tables 1.1-1.3, and may
also be found in Appendix 1 on page 99 for future reference.
The first category (Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy) relies on a
country’s unique historical context. The consideration of each country’s historical, cultural,
political, and socioeconomic contexts and how each relates to the success or failure of its
democratization process is by nature less clear-cut than that of democracy’s objectively
necessary qualities. However, due to the unique nature of every single state in the world, these
characteristics are perhaps the most important to consider. When it comes to studying the United
States’ failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, it is critical to examine if and when the
democracy planners ignored internal conditions in each state, thus negatively impacting the
democratization process. The distinction between this analytical category and the second
category (Universal Characteristics of Democracy) is that while this category recognizes that
each country’s existing historical, cultural, or economic realities can affect differently the
possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization that result from these unique traits,
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the second category relies on the United States’ understanding of democracy as independent
from how it relates to a specific country. In other words, a country that is declared “democratic”
would reflect what is universally considered as democratic. That aside, the internal democratic
characteristics associated with each country’s various contexts are represented in Table 1.1:
TABLE 1.1
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY
Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)
Homogenous society (Dahl)
Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)
Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)
Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)
Urbanization levels (Lipset)
Education levels (Lipset
Economic success (Lipset)
Strength of civil society (Putnam)

When considering Table 1.1, we must remember Whitehead’s warning that we cannot insist on
standardized outcomes when engaging in democratization, as that would be the equivalent to
ignoring each country’s historical, political, and cultural contexts. These characteristics are not
something that any state is able to craft and give to another in its efforts to speed along
democratization. Timelines of democratization are never as speedy as democracy planners would
hope for, and the length of any planned engagement must take into account the internal
conditions of the country in consideration.
The second category (Universal Characteristics of Democracy) was chosen because there
are agreed upon, common goals and prerequisites satisfying the Western model of liberal
democracy that we can use to decipher how to construct democracies as well as how to judge
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what went wrong when they fail. Constructing this category consisted mainly of collecting all of
the objective characteristics for democracy listed in the previous theory section and refining
them into a list that can be used to examine Haiti and Iraq. When the United States declares a
country to be “democratic,” it follows that these are the characteristics a democracy should have.
These characteristics—and the theorists they are attributed to—are represented in Table 1.2:
TABLE 1.2
UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY
Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)
Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)
Alternative sources of information (Dahl)
Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)
Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)
Strong political leadership (Huntington)
Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)
Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)
Legitimate political parties (Lipset)
Justice and rule of law (Lipset)
Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)

Although some of these features of democracy seen in Table 1.2 have to do mainly with Western
values of liberal democracy, the majority of them rely upon the strength, legitimacy, and stability
of lasting democratic institutions. For example, free, fair, and frequent elections can only be
conducted if the government has created an institution through which people can make their
voices heard—if there were no systems in place, anarchy or tyranny would likely ensue.
Alternatively, there can be no lasting and legitimate constitution without the power of rule of law
to enforce it. While these authors differ in what they consider to be the most important when
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approaching the construction of democracy, they all agree that the creation and maintenance of
governmental institutions is the key to a successful transition to democracy, and something that
is universally desirable when constructing democracies.
Finally, the third category (Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization) contains
characteristics that are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, but also on
universal characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. These are
not as simple as listing the opposites of what we desire in a democracy—they exist separately as
things that democracy planners must account for, work against, and anticipate. While this list
incorporates the obstacles taken from the theorists discussed in the previous section, it does not
contain many of the unique obstacles that the Clinton and Bush administrations faced in Haiti
and Iraq, as those will be explained with great detail in later sections. The obstacles to
democracy and democratization as derived from the theorists previously discussed are
represented below in Table 1.3:
TABLE 1.3
OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)
Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)
Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)
Poverty (Huntington)
Lack of stability (Huntington)
Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)
Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)
Militarized democratization (Zakaria)
Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)
Misdirected international funding (Carothers)
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As stated in regards to the intrinsic characteristics contained within each state, while these
obstacles represented in Table 1.3 certainly make it more difficult to democratize, they do not
make it an impossible endeavor. However, the more obstacles to democracy confronted by those
who wish to democratize, the less likely it will be for the country in question to successfully
democratize. Together, these three categories help us to frame and evaluate what went wrong in
Haiti and Iraq, and what policy makers might learn about the act of exporting democracy around
the world. The following chapter presents an analysis of the United States’ democratization
efforts in Haiti as they relate to this theoretical structure.
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II. HAITI
On December 16 1990, the world rejoiced as it watched Haiti peacefully elect its firstever democratic president in the nation’s troubled and violent history. Unfortunately, JeanBertrand Aristide’s promises of economic prosperity, peace, and security for the chaotic and
bankrupt state were never realized. Nine months into his first term as president, Aristide was
overthrown by a military coup led by Haitian Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras. Despite
numerous plans, agreements, and embargoes then placed on Haiti to pressure the de-facto
government, the United States failed to reinstate Aristide without military intervention. Thus, on
September 15 1994, President Clinton announced the United States’ planned invasion of Haiti in
order to promote and uphold democracy in our hemisphere. While the Cédras regime was
eventually removed, the Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an
insufficient time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in
Haiti during and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a
successful and stable democracy.
In order to understand where and when the Clinton administration maneuvered poorly in
its policy plans, it is important to examine the Haiti case as it relates to the characteristics of
democracy and democratization provided in the previous section. Accordingly, this section
proceeds in the following manner: first, it presents and analyzes Haiti’s political, social, and
economic contexts as they relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.
Second, it examines the United States’ actions during the three years leading up to military
invasion, analyzing the Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization that the Clinton
administrated faced in light of the conditions in Haiti. Finally, it provides an analysis of the
invasion itself and its aftermath, evaluating the state of democracy in Haiti against the Universal
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Characteristics of Democracy. This case will demonstrate that while the Clinton administration
constructed opportunities for elections, created programs for reforming the police force, and
funneled money into structurally adjusting Haiti’s economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying
political, economic, and social contexts, fundamentally misunderstood the necessary
characteristics required for a successful and stable democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti
before democracy could truly be realized.

CONDITIONS IN HAITI PRIOR TO INVASION
If we recall from the previous section, the characteristics associated with the internal
evolution of democracy within a country, as listed on page 99, provide a structure with which to
evaluate Haiti’s prospects for democracy. Although none of the Internal Characteristics of
Democracy alone are the difference between success and failure in the realm of democratization,
if enough are not met, it becomes all that much more difficult for democracy to develop. As we
examine the conditions in Haiti prior to Clinton’s invasion, looking at its history as well as its
social, political, and economic conditions, it is unfortunately true that Haiti lacked nearly all of
these internal conditions. For example, Dahl tells us that a democratic belief and political culture
are ideal characteristics for a society to exhibit in order to more successfully develop democracy.
Additionally, Huntington is quick to remind policy makers of the importance of economic
success when attempting to restructure government. However, Haiti has neither been successful
in developing a functioning economy, nor has its dictatorial rule encouraged a supportive
democratic culture. In examining Haiti’s history with more detail, it is clear that the island nation
lacked most key characteristics that would have assisted with its democratization.
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Haiti’s history is one that has been consumed with violence, famine, corruption, and
poverty. Despite the spotlight placed on the military junta that controlled Haiti from 1991 to
1994, the junta’s theft of democracy from Aristide was simply the latest in a long string of cruel
regimes preventing the country from developing economically and progressing politically.
Gaining its independence in 1804 from the French through a slave-led revolution, Haiti’s destiny
as the first free black republic should have been prosperous. Haiti, however, had been left in
literal and economic ruin by the time of its independence.23 The cost of the war bankrupted the
new state, crippling its chances for successful development. Additionally, Haiti’s main source of
income relied on subsistence agriculture, and in the face of self-perpetuating poverty and the
inability to advance their farming techniques, Haitians turned to deforestation in order to create
and sell charcoal for fuel.24 Unfortunately, this led to erosion of the land available for farming,
which, to this day, has remained one of the main sources of income for the state, as well as the
eventual development of a textile industry. In 1990, before the collapse of Aristide’s
administration, Haiti’s GDP per capita was approximately $360 per year: less than 50 percent of
its population had access to clean water, its citizens’ life expectancy was 53 years, and 28
percent of Haitian children younger than five were malnourished.25 Haiti’s economic state defies
Dahl, Huntington, and Lipset’s ideals for the type of environment necessary for democratization:
Haiti did not have a successful market economy, let alone a functioning economy of any kind.
Even before the United States further devastated the Western hemisphere’s poorest state with
harsh embargoes, Haiti was not positioned well to develop democracy. Again, while economic
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success is not the only defining factor in democratic development, it is certainly an important one
when looking at Haiti’s extreme levels of poverty.
Haiti’s political past also informed its democratization prospects. As we can recall,
according to Lipset, Linz, and Stepan, a supportive democratic culture is absolutely more
beneficial for the development of democracy than a culture and government that is hostile,
violent, and dictatorial. In order for a government to make democratic changes, as argued by
both Linz and Stepan, it ideally needs to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of each member of
society. Haiti has been haunted by political instability and dictatorial autocracy for decades,
making it impossible to foster legitimacy or a supportive democratic culture. Its political pattern
is one that can be characterized by violent coups leading to unstable and frequent changes in
government. Each new government was again followed by a violent coup when it failed to live
up to expectations.26 This is illustrated by the fact that between the years 1843 and 1915, Haiti
experienced 102 revolts, civil wars, and revolutions.27
Haiti’s history has known very little stability, which contributed to its high levels of
violence and thus weakened its civil society, which Putnam tells us is critical to securing
democracy. In examining Haiti’s political past, it is clear that its governments failed to engender
legitimacy, or create a culture of democratic belief and support. Ideally, the legitimacy of a
government can be seen in the eyes of its people: it is received in trust from civil society, not
taken by force and maintained by the military. Instead of crafting lasting institutions to support
strong governance, Haiti’s governments have relied almost singularly on its armed forces for
maintaining order and rule of law, until the first, and ultimately ineffective, American occupation
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from 1915 to 1934.28 This occupation robbed the Haitians of their dignity and failed to create a
lasting difference in the government. While the U.S. soldiers assisted in building roads,
constructing schools, and maintaining a stable environment, they took all agency away from
Haiti’s government: the United States had total veto power over all governmental and economic
decisions in Haiti, essentially confiscating its independence for the duration of the occupation.
In tracing Haiti’s fraught political history, we can now turn to the Duvalier Regime,
which will provide the political backdrop to Aristide’s brief presidency, including the conditions
that Aristide inherited when he took office: beginning with François Duvalier (Papa Doc) in
1957, and ending with his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Bébé Doc) in1986, these twin regimes
further damaged Haiti’s democratic prospects with their brutal rule and lack of respect for basic
human rights. While Papa Doc was initially popular, his rule eventually marked the height of
cruelty in the Haitian government. The Duvalier regime can be characterized by its political
terror, economic incompetence and rampant violence with the use of the Tonton Macoutes,
Duvalier’s private police force, which ensured the regime’s total control of power by instilling
fear in the urban and rural areas of the country.29 This notorious police force, numbering
approximately 100,000 at the time the Duvalier regime ended, routinely executed children, raped
women, and killed without discretion, effectively destroying civil society in Haiti. Many scholars
blame the effects of the Duvalier regime as the reason why Haiti has been unable to sustain
democracy, as it removed all forms of opposition to its government, making the democratic
process impossible when, years later, the time came for elections.30 While it is clear that Haiti’s
political past cannot be characterized as supportive to democratization, it is important to
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remember that these characteristics become more consequential when paired with others that are
equally as unfavorable to democracy. Thus, Haiti’s limited prior experience with democracy
cannot be solely blamed for the United States’ inability to install democracy in the island nation.
Before turning to consider Aristide’s brief “democracy” and the United States’ actions
prior to the invasion, it is necessary to bring to light Haiti’s social contexts. Haiti divides itself
along the lines of race, education, and urbanization. With its history as a French-colonized slave
state, 90 percent of its population is black (noir) whereas only 10 percent is made up from the
lighter-skinned mulâtres. Historically, the color of one’s skin highly determined one’s level of
economic prosperity and education, as Haiti’s mulatto elite often monopolized power.31
Although homogeneity is not entirely necessary to secure a functional democracy (the United
States, if we recall, is proof of this), in a state where other factors are stacked against its
development, it may very well be a detriment.
Furthermore, Lipset reminds us that urbanization and education levels are important
when evaluating a state’s proclivity toward democracy. While Haiti is not entirely homogenous,
as discussed previously, its low levels of education and urbanization are of greater concern when
considering democratization. Haiti is divided in its language. While the official language in Haiti
was listed until 1987 as French, the majority of the population speaks Creole, with only 5-10
percent of the population, the economic and political elite, fluent in French.32 Thus, the language
of government (French) is inaccessible to the majority of the Haitian population, creating yet
another barrier to democracy. Moreover, in 1990, the year of Aristide’s election, almost 75
percent of Haiti’s population of 7 million was functionally illiterate. This systemic lack of
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available education then hurts the country’s economy and prevents its citizens from being fully
educated and able to participate politically.
Another important point of division exists between Haiti’s cities and its rural poor. Only
10 percent of the country is urbanized, with the rest dedicated to subsistence farming.33 This
division localizes what little wealth Haiti has to its cities, while the other 90 percent of the
population lives in extreme poverty in the more rural areas of the island. Thus, Haiti’s
urbanization and education levels, combined with its racial divisions, make the prospect of
democracy even more difficult to pursue. Haiti’s economic, political, and social conditions prior
to the United States’ involvement reveal there was very little that could have been done in order
to overcome the country’s structural barriers to democracy.
Despite criticisms from the CIA, Clinton made clear in the years leading up to the
invasion that he supported Aristide through numerous rhetorical commitments, promising that
the United States would “restore democracy and President Aristide [to Haiti] as soon as
possible,” unequivocally linking Haiti’s return to democracy with Aristide’s return to his
country.34 It was sharply debated, however, whether Haiti’s president (or his administration) was
democratic. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in December of 1990 with 67.5 percent of
the vote while representatives from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United
Nations (UN) sent representatives to ensure a peaceful beginning to Haiti’s transition to
democracy. As discussed in one of the numerous Congressional Hearings on the matter, many
believed that the international delegation, which included former President Carter, made a grave
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mistake in pulling out of Haiti so soon after the election of Aristide.35 While the United Nations
Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) ensured a peaceful
election, they did not stay to ensure a peaceful administration, or a functioning democracy.
Aristide’s popularity, which was garnered from the disadvantaged poor and leveraged by the
Lavalas movement,36 was indisputable when compared to the U.S.—favored candidate in 1990
Marc Bazin, a pro-American representative from the IMF with little support from the people.37 A
Populist at heart, Aristide promised the Haitian poor that they would no longer be terrorized by
the Tonton Macoutes or forgotten by the government. However, when elected to a bankrupt
government with no judicial system, and little infrastructure to speak of, his promises were
difficult to keep.
As discussed previously, Haiti’s biggest hurdles to overcome in its pursuit of democracy
were its lack of security, justice, education, and economic development.38 Once in office,
Aristide attempted to tackle these weaknesses, but in doing so he alienated the people within his
government from whom he needed support. For example: in his first month in office, Aristide
fired all of the army’s senior officers, engendering bitter and hostile feelings within the only
operational arm of the state.39 This maneuver angered the already violent and coup-prone army,
and was ultimately the nail in Aristide’s own coffin: members of the disenfranchised army
organized the coup that forced him to flee the country. Aristide also lost support in parliament
when he refused to accept the nomination of any member of the Front National pour le
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Changement et la Démocratie (FNCD), the political party that helped elect him.40 Finally,
Aristide promoted violent and undemocratic behavior from his supporters, encouraging
necklacing41 against Duvalier supporters when there was no police force to monitor the streets,
even going so far as to enthusiastically tell his people to “give [them] what [they] deserve” as
people were burning to death.42 Aristide encouraged violence with his words, and this violence
that impeded Haiti’s security was ultimately detrimental to the development of democracy,
which requires legal opposition parties and civil society organizations that can voice their
opinions within a secure environment.
Despite Clinton’s willing partnership with Aristide, the fiery nationalist was not
universally seen as the best choice for U.S. security interests. Two days after Aristide told his
citizens to continue murdering people in the streets, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the
military coup that brought Aristide’s administration to a shuddering halt. It seems clear that
Aristide would not bring Haiti democracy. Yet the Clinton administration, despite opposition
from Congress (with the exception of the Black Caucus), the CIA, and U.S. popular opinion,
rallied behind Aristide and promised that returning him to his government would ensure
democracy.43 With the choice between Cédras and Aristide, Clinton chose the latter and in doing
so, unquestioningly linked Aristide with Haiti’s democratization prospects. Yes, a democratic
election brought Haitians a new president in 1990, but Haiti itself still lacked security, justice,
education, and a functioning economy. As we have seen, democracy cannot be solely defined by
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an election. Haiti faced insurmountable structural obstacles to democracy that a charismatic
president could not overcome alone. Despite the fact that Clinton’s mission in Haiti was named
“Operation Uphold Democracy,” it is clear that for democratization to take hold in Haiti, the
country would need much more than its former leader returned home.44

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS HAITI: 1991—1994
In the three years between Cédras’ coup and the United States’ invasion (September
1991—September 1994), Presidents Bush and Clinton faced numerous obstacles to the
democratization of Haiti. These obstacles resulted in part from domestic issues that arose while
the administrations were attempting a diplomatic solution to the crisis, as well as from a
misunderstanding of the situation on the ground in Haiti and a failure to consider aspects of
democracy unrelated to elections. This section will analyze the Obstacles to Democracy and
Democratization with the structure and characteristics identified in the previous chapter as
applied to Haiti As we will see, the economic embargoes placed on Haiti in an effort to draw
Cédras out of a stalemate only increased levels of poverty, further divided society along lines of
wealth and access, created more violence in the streets, and generally decreased the levels of
stability in the state as a whole—all considered detrimental obstacles in the pursuit of democracy
by our scholars on the subject. Additionally, the Clinton administration underestimated the
leaders of the authoritarian regime in negotiations, which harmed the Haitian people. Finally,
when the time came to plan how democracy would unfold in Haiti, the growing refugee problem
and its domestic impact compelled Clinton to design a mission that was insufficient in time and
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scope, viewing the election as the final step in democratization, in contrast to both Zakaria and
Whitehead, who argue that conducting an election is but one step in a larger process.
Before analyzing the domestic obstacles to Clinton’s “Operation Uphold Democracy,” it
is necessary to examine more closely Clinton’s motivation for getting involved in the first place.
There are several possibilities that have come to light. First, the United States seeks to
universally support democracy and prevent human rights violations, which it finds “intolerable
everywhere, but are unconscionable on our doorstep.”45 Second, Haiti is in the American sphere
of influence, and pertinent to US foreign policy, as established by Clinton’s most famous foreign
policy endeavor of “Engagement and Enlargement” in which he demonstrates a “firm
commitment to expanding the global realm of democracy.”46 Third, as we will discuss, the
Haitian refugee problem was getting out of control: by the spring of 1994, the refugees held at
Guantanamo had already cost the U.S. government $200 million and the U.S. Coast Guard had
already turned away tens of thousands of displaced Haitians.47 Fourth, the United States had
suffered continual humiliation from Cédras’ junta since the inception of the coup, in addition to
the international embarrassment the Clinton administration had been feeling due to its failures in
Bosnia and Rwanda. Finally, ensuring the success of democracy in Haiti benefits US interests,
such as free markets, economic opportunity, and national security, because as President Clinton
frequently noted, “democracies don’t attack each other.”48 Due to these overlapping incentives, it
is important to examine the President’s policy choices regarding Haiti as well as the domestic
pressures weighing on Clinton during the three years that the Cédras coup held Haiti hostage. As
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we will see, the competing interests of the Clinton administration were ultimately harmful to
Operation Uphold Democracy.
When faced with the collapse of Aristide’s government, the United States crippled Haiti
with three years of ineffectual embargoes as it attempted to unseat the Cédras regime that had
taken hold in the island nation. Days after the coup had unseated Aristide, President George
Bush initiated Executive Order 12775, prohibiting Haitian access to US assets and all transfers of
money to Haiti.49 This was followed by Executive Order No. 12779 of October 28, 1991, and to
the same end President Clinton followed suit with Executive Orders No. 12853 of June 30, 1993,
No. 12872 of October 18, 1993, No. 12914 of May 7, 1994, No. 12917 of May 21, 1994, No.
12920 of June 10, 1994, and No. 12922 of June 21, 1994.50 As each embargo failed to bring the
Cédras regime to the negotiating table, the sanctions increased in severity throughout the three
years Cédras was in power, limiting oil, arms, and eventually all trade to Haiti. While economic
sanctions can prove very effective when sending a message to another country, the United States
failed to make an impact on the military junta as the sanctions were felt not by the junta, but by
the already starving Haitian poor. Additionally, not all of Haiti’s trading partners followed the
U.S. embargoes, until UN and OAS involvement in June of 1993 with UNSC Resolution 841,
which placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.
Instead of helping democracy return to Haiti, the United States’ push for economic
sanctions only damaged the state’s infrastructure, increased levels of violence, sickness, and
famine, and unquestionably worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country. As the United
States supplied between 60 to 65 percent of Haiti’s imports, as well as received approximately 85
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percent of the country’s exports, both President Bush and President Clinton with the support of
Congress, expected the embargoes to have a crippling effect.51 Unfortunately, the embargoes did
indeed cripple Haiti, but it did not seem to touch the military junta as was planned. While the
United States maintained that its mission was to “peacefully, but very forcefully help Haiti’s
legitimately elected president and Haiti’s democratic leaders reverse this coup,” the embargoes,
which acted as a “sledgehammer” against the Haitian poor, made it impossible to carve out
humanitarian exceptions.52 Despite President Bush’s guarantee that “our actions are directed at
those in Haiti who are opposing a return to democracy, not the Haitian poor,” the poor were
exactly the segment of the population to first and foremost feel the effects of the sanctions.53
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the economic sanctions on the majority of Haitians,
we must examine the relevant statistics before and after the military coup. During Aristide’s
presidency, only 50 percent of the labor force was employed, one third of the population lacked
access to modern health services, and 20 percent of Haitian children did not have access to
education.54 While it is generally agreed upon that embargoes should be conducted in a way that
prevents unnecessary suffering, the economic impact was felt most severely by the rural poor,
women, and unskilled factory workers, rather than the well-off military junta. Between 1991 and
1994, Haiti lost 30,000 jobs, the number of workers employed in the assembly industry sector
declined from 44,000 to 8,000, and the per capita income decreased by 30 percent to $250 per

51

Update on the Situation in Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 102nd Cong., 25 (1991) (Statement of
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State).
52
Update on the Situation in Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 102nd Cong., 2 (1991) (Statement of
Congressman Torricelli, chairman of the subcommittee).
53
George Bush: "Statement on Denying Use of United States Ports to Vessels Trading With Haiti," May
28, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
54
Gibbons, Elizabeth and Richard Garfield. “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Human
Rights in Haiti, 1991—1994.” American Journal of Public Health 89, no. 10 (October, 1999), 1499

	
  

40

year.55 Regarding education, nutrition, and basic human rights, the embargoes were equally
damaging. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) estimated that during the years of the
coup, the number of children in the street doubled to 4,000 and the gross school enrollment fell
from 83 percent to 57 percent in 1994. The number of malnourished children also increased from
one in five to one in four, as the humanitarian aid designated by the United States was unable to
reach the rural poor due to gas shortages and inaccessibility of roads.56 The embargoes remain
incredibly relevant to the democratization efforts in Haiti because, as the poorest nation in the
hemisphere, even testimony in U.S. Congress noted that “without economic growth, there shall
be no democracy in Haiti… it is absolutely vital.”57 While economic development is not
absolutely necessary for every burgeoning democracy—for example, in India at its time of
independence, 85 percent of the population was rural58—Haiti’s condition as the poorest state in
the Western hemisphere made it particularly susceptible to any type of sanction.
The embargoes worsened conditions in Haiti so much so that they further divided society,
increased poverty and violence levels, and decreased stability, conditions that theorists such as
Dahl and Huntington argue are obstacles to democracy. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton
administrations anticipated the destabilizing effects of poverty and resulting violence within the
state when constructing the economic sanctions, and was therefore embarrassed over the course
of three years by a small, but very resilient military coup. Both Clinton and Bush underestimated
the power and adaptability of the authoritarian de facto government, leading the people of Haiti
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to question the United States’ commitment to Haiti.59 In short: due to lack of consideration for
the social, political, and economic conditions on the ground in Haiti, the U.S.—instituted
embargoes seriously inhibited the growth of democracy in the island nation.
One of the key domestic pressure points that called for U.S. action in Haiti, and one that
Clinton faced in his first term, was the growing Haitian refugee crisis. During his campaign,
Clinton had promised to reverse President Bush’s policy of returning the Haitian “Boat People”
unjustly back to their broken country, but once in office, he maintained the limitations and
claimed that the refugees were economic in nature, rather than political. The state of Florida had
already initiated a $1 billion dollar lawsuit against the federal government for spending on illegal
immigrants over the years.60 Clinton could not afford to alienate Florida, or its congressional
representatives, as it was a key swing state in national elections. However, this restrictive
immigration policy was extremely controversial: The Congressional Black Caucus, led by
Congressman Charles B. Rangel, accused the Clinton administration of a racist immigration
policy towards the Haitians, asking in regard to what makes the Haiti refugee policy different
during a Congressional hearing, “is it the color?”61 The administration faced additional criticism
from Human Rights Watch for its refugee policy because the coup had internally displaced
300,000 Haitians, 42,000 of which had attempted over the course of three years to escape to the
United States.62 Although the Clinton administration ultimately softened its immigration policy,
the United States was still looking at a growing humanitarian crisis in its backyard, ineffectual
59

Morris Morley and Chris McGillon, “’Disobediant’ Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization:
The Clinton Administration and Haiti.” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (1997): 363-384
60
von Hippel, “Democratization as Foreign Policy,” 11
61
U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103rd Cong., 16 (1994) (Statement of Charles
B. Rangel, a representative in Congress from the state of New York).
62
U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing before	
  the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103rd Cong., 10 (1994) (Statement of Carrie
Meek, a representative of Congress from the state of Florida). 	
  

	
  

42

embargoes, and a promise to “restore democracy in Haiti and restore President Aristide as the
elected leader of that country” that was beginning to ring false.63 Facing pressure form the Black
Caucus, Florida, and the international community, Clinton had nowhere to go except Haiti. Thus,
while the Clinton doctrine reaffirms the United States’ commitment to democracy around the
world, it seems evident that Clinton’s decision to ultimately invade Haiti was also a product of
his domestic political calculations.
When considering his options with how to proceed in Haiti, Clinton utilized the UN in
conjunction with the OAS to assist in returning Aristide to Haiti. This was Clinton’s way of
ensuring a limited US time commitment in Haiti, as well as a demonstration of his previously
stated commitment to multilateralism over unilateral action by a superpower. However, as we
know from Whitehead, an insufficient time commitment in any democratization effort does not
often lead to a stable and successful democracy. In light of the military coup that forced Aristide
to flee the country, and given that Cédras’ thugs were “executing orphaned children, raping
young girls, killing priests, mutilating people and leaving body parts in the open to terrify
others,”64 the UN and OAS appointed Dante Caputo, the former minister for foreign affairs of
Argentina, as the special envoy to Haiti in January of 1993. He was charged with the
responsibility of diplomatically restoring democracy to Haiti. His mission was known as
MICIVIH, or “International Civilian Mission in Haiti,” and its top three objectives were to return
Aristide to Haiti, appoint a Prime Minister, and resolve the question of amnesty for Cédras and
his thugs.65 Caputo worked closely with U.S. special envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, but
their efforts were unsuccessful as Cédras was unwilling to negotiate. Thus, on June 16 1993, the
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UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 841, imposing new oil and arms
embargoes against Haiti.66 There is no doubt that this action lead to the Governor’s Island
Agreement on July 3 1993 that promised to restore Aristide peacefully, but unfortunately the
agreement did not come to fruition when the United States and the UN again underestimated the
tenacity of the Cédras regime: when it came time to re-instate Aristide, in October of 1993,
Cédras refused to cooperate, and the agreement was nullified.
Despite the initial failure of the agreement, it is important look at it closely as it remained
the indispensable plan of action for the US, UN, and OAS when the time came to invade Haiti in
September of 1994 during “Operation Uphold Democracy.” The plan contained several concrete
steps: first, President Aristide would appoint a new commander in chief to replace Cédras, who
would be granted amnesty along with the rest of the de facto government. Following his
reinstatement in Haiti, President Aristide would appoint a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the
newly reconstituted Parliament. Finally, after these measures were observed, all U.S., UN and
OAS sanctions were to be suspended. At this time, the agreement specified that monetary foreign
assistance would help with job creation, social development, and most importantly, the
installation and training of a new police force that was made separate from the army. All of this
was expected to take approximately 3-5 years in total.67 Additionally, the mandate would call for
elections to be held for municipal and Parliamentary seats, as well as for presidential elections at
the end of Aristide’s term. One year later, in September of 1994, these steps remained the agreed
upon course of action for the invasion of Haiti, with an important exception: the use of military
force to implement them.
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The Governor’s Island Agreement was an important moment of diplomacy for Aristide,
Cédras, and the United States, but the initial agreement ultimately failed for several reasons: it
had an insufficient time commitment to the growth of democratic institutions, it viewed
conducting elections as the final step in the plan, and the sign of a finished success, and its
misdirected international funding made Haiti subject to the kind of neo-liberal economic
practices characterized by IMF structural adjustment programs that had already made other
governments around the world unpopular. Although the agreement promised foreign assistance
in job creation and social development programs, the aid package would be based on compliance
with undercutting, neo-liberal modifications and defunding of government programs such as
public education, healthcare, and support for businesses.68 These known obstacles to democracy
inhibited a democratic government from successfully developing in Haiti. Despite apprehension
expressed in Congressional hearings that the largest humanitarian concern in Haiti was the
complete decimation of its civil society, or its lack of economic growth, or even the
responsibility to “help rebuilt Haiti… not simply engraft the government and walk away,”69 the
governor’s island negotiations, which molded the eventual invasion and Operation Uphold
Democracy, failed to account for Haiti’s lack of democratic experience, poverty, instability, and
the staying power of the Cédras regime. While these concerns were brought to light, Clinton
chose to ultimately ignore the apprehension of the legislative branch and maneuver through the
approval of the UN for an eventual military engagement in Haiti.
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THE INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH: EVALUATING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
This final section of the Haiti case evaluates Operation Uphold Democracy and its
aftermath, using the Universal Characteristics of Democracy to provide insight into whether or
not the “remarkable coalition” truly “restored democracy to Haiti,” as President Clinton had
claimed.70 While the Governor’s Island agreement and the following UN involvement in
Operation Uphold Democracy allowed for the restoration of President Aristide, the appointment
of a Prime Minister, and free, fair, and frequent elections, other crucial aspects of democracy
were missing, thus weakening the democratization efforts. Haiti’s lack of security or control of
force inhibited civil society’s sustained freedom of expression, its ability to participate
politically—all characteristics deemed necessary for democracy by Dahl, Huntington, Linz and
Stepan, and Lipset. The absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law close to
impossible, as well as undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. Finally, Haiti’s dire
economic situation and budget restrictions mandated by the IMF prevented the development of
infrastructure that the island nation desperately needed to function democratically and
economically. Therefore, while the trappings of democracy were constructed in Haiti due to the
scheduled elections, it is clear that unfortunately, the majority of the Universal Characteristics of
Democracy, as defined by our scholars of democratization, were not met. As we will see, the
Clinton administration, in conjunction with the UN, failed to provide sufficient time to develop
the key democratic institutions and characteristics, thus dooming Haiti to instability and chaos.
On September 15 1994, President Clinton announced to the world that the United States
would be “leading the international effort to restore democratic government in Haiti” in a
military operation that would be “limited and specific,” utilizing an overwhelming 20,000 troops
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in an effort to minimize casualties on both sides with a time commitment guaranteeing
Americans soldiers a return home no later than March of the following year.71 Previously, on
July 31 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 940 had granted President Clinton the right to
invade Haiti due to the Cédras regime’s obscene human rights violations and the Haitian
people’s right to the democracy they had previously chosen. During the speech, Clinton appealed
directly to America’s idealistic values of upholding democracy, protecting human rights, and
securing borders. As both Congress and the majority of the population were opposed to any
military engagement in Haiti, Clinton used explicit language to describe the violent situation on
the ground, quoting a Haitian child who once told a visitor “I do not care if the police kill me
because it only brings an end to my suffering” and positioning the US not as “the world’s
police,” but as a country that has a “responsibility to act” when democracy is denied to a nation
in our “backyard.”72 This mission would redeem Clinton from his previous international failures,
and prove to the rest of the world that the United States would not shy away from its
commitments, even if it took three years to fulfill its promises.
Ahead of the military forces, President Clinton sent former President Carter, General
Colin Powell, and Senator Samuel Nunn to attempt diplomatic negotiation with Cédras one final
time in light of the promised military engagement. The negotiations, which proceeded up until
the U.S. military was landing in Port-au-Prince, were miraculously successful, but did not
ultimately remove the occupation presence from the island.73 The diplomatic coalition, backed
by the pressure of the U.S. military, reached an agreement that allowed the military leaders of
Haiti to leave with amnesty, so long as the remaining provisions of the Governor’s Island
Agreement, as discussed previously, could be carried out. The US forces, instead of facing an
71
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active engagement, would act as a peaceful occupation force as part of a UN coalition (15,000
member multinational force as specified by UN Security Council Resolution 940) to guarantee
that the dictators carried out the terms of the agreement.74 This large force would be scaled down
incrementally as Haiti built its own democracy that was independent from the MNF
(multinational force). With the UN involvement, Clinton could keep his promise of limited U.S.
participation in restoring democracy to Haiti without committing to a long military engagement.
He also promised the American people that their troops would come home as soon as elections
were held in the spring of 1995.75 However, as we will see in the numerous UN Security Council
reports on the status of Haiti’s transition, this would prove to be an insufficient period of time in
which democracy could be rebuilt in Haiti.
The invasion itself was brief, and by the Governor’s Island Agreement’s definitions
successful: by October 15 1994, the military junta had been disbanded; Aristide had been
reinstated, and had named Smarck Michel as his new Prime Minister. The new government, with
its newly reinstated Parliament, took office on November 8 1994.76 The next steps would be to
create and train a new police force, restructure the army, hold elections, and utilize international
monetary aid to boost Haiti’s economy. Correspondingly, legislative elections were scheduled
for June and September of 1995, with Presidential elections to follow in December of that same
year. In the words of President Clinton, the invasion was only ever designed to “provide a secure
environment for the restoration of President Aristide and democracy, to begin the work of
retraining the police and the military in a professional manner, and to facilitate a quick handoff
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to the United Nations mission so that the work of restoring democracy can be continued, the
developmental aid can begin to flow, Haiti can be rebuilt, and in 1995 another free and fair
election for President can be held.”77 Unfortunately, none of these steps were successful longterm. Clinton viewed elections as the final step in democratization, but as we know, elections do
not ensure an inclusive and educated citizenship, nor do they guarantee political legitimacy and
stability of government, characteristics all deemed necessary for successful democratization. In
short, the invasion planned for the trappings of democracy and little else. It is in the aftermath of
the invasion—in the time of building, peacekeeping, and restructuring—that the Clinton
administration’s mistakes in transplanting democracy to Haiti become clear.
After the invasion, the rapid dismissal of the Haitian military caused the creation of the
police force to begin in a chaotic, haphazard manner. Despite its violent crimes against the
Haitian people, the army was really the only functioning body in the state, and its quick
dissolution caused problems for the US forces in Haiti. As the invasion agreement required a
functioning police force and restructuring of the army, the MNF were asked to train former
members of the oppressive force into defenders of human rights in a short period of time.78
According to a Security Council report submitted in January of 1995, it was observed that “the
collapse of the FADH and the dissolution of the corps of section chiefs have created a security
void that has contributed to a marked increase in banditry and criminality throughout the
country,” causing a large portion of the population to be “afraid to meet or demonstrate,” thus
decreasing personal freedoms and political participation.79 Members of the permanent national
police, known as the Haitian National Police (HNP) did not begin training until February 1995,
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with training lasting around four months in order to get the HNP functioning independently as
soon as possible.80 However, this fast turnaround affected the HNP for years to come, exhibiting
another example of insufficient time commitment to the Haitian democracy project. Even a year
after the creation of the police force, the most serious concern for the HNP was the “absence of
competent senior officers and overall leadership,” a direct result of insufficient training.81 Instead
of the control of force creating legitimacy and stability for Haiti and its government, the
ineffectiveness of the HNP and its “lack of qualified staff, adequate premises, and equipment”82
only destabilized the country. The new police force was essentially unable to ensure security and
reduce violence in Haiti, resulting in a lack of basic freedoms of person and damaging civil
society as a whole, all in all weakening Haiti’s new “democratic” government.
Furthermore, Haiti lacked a functioning justice system and strong rule of law; important
characteristics that have been argued to be absolutely necessary for a functioning democracy.
Despite Aristide’s insistence in creating programs to restructure the judicial system in Haiti,
Operation Uphold Democracy did not allocate sufficient resources or time to the forces of justice
in the country.83 Without a functioning justice system, there can be no democracy. The
agreement to give the Cédras regime amnesty only contributed to “rising frustration at the
inability of the justice system to address past human rights violations and current criminality.”84
This was especially upsetting as it was estimated that during his regime 4,000 people were killed,
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300,000 were internally displaced, and more than 60,000 took to the sea on rafts.85 Additionally,
the courts suffered from a long-standing lack of supporting infrastructure, such as inadequate
prison systems and courthouses that were on stand-by for rehabilitation.86 These factors
contributed to weakening Aristide’s legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of Haiti’s burgeoning
democracy. More than two years after the invasion, in March of 1997, the situation with regard
to the judiciary system “remained critical,” revealing an absolute lack of progress in the
development of the necessary infrastructure.87 Any security or protection of human rights
enjoyed by the Haitians as a consequence of the invasion remained incredibly fragile. However
successful from a military standpoint, Operation Uphold Democracy failed to deliver its
promises. As we have seen, without basic freedoms of person, rule of law, and the protection of a
functioning judicial system, successful democracy cannot be realized.
The humanitarian and developmental concerns in Haiti, despite the United States’
declarations that Haiti had achieved democracy, were just as pertinent as its problems with
security and judicial reform, and equally as detrimental to the creation of a lasting and legitimate
government. As established previously, the lack of economic development in Haiti largely
contributed to its previous inability to develop democracy, thus its economic state in wake of the
invasion must be examined. Despite the economic sanctions being lifted in light of Aristide’s
return, Haiti’s slow economic recovery continued to cripple its people, further limiting the
growth of democracy in the state. For example, before the embargoes, the number of people
employed in the assembly sector was estimated at 65,000 people, and neared zero in 1994.
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However, by 1997, this number had only rebounded to 18,000.88 Additionally, the financial
commitment of international allies to Haiti’s democratic development and its corresponding neoliberal economic agenda did not do much to alleviate the rampant poverty that remained in the
state for years to come, as noted in a UN Security Council report in June of 1996, which
observed a “growing demand for social services and infrastructure, such as medical and
educational facilities, roads, electricity, and improved living conditions.”89 In the years after the
invasion, and still to this day, Haiti’s economic situation can be characterized by low growth,
high unemployment, and an impoverished population. By March of 1997, the decreasing
international commitment to support only served to further the violence and unrest that were
fuelled by “persistent high levels of unemployment, a rising cost of living, impatience at the slow
pace of change, and the attempts made by certain sectors to profit politically from growing
popular frustrations and discontent.”90 Without the proper support for police and judicial
institutional projects, crimes against humanity grew while the Haitian economy remained
stagnant. The economy simply could not support the efforts to sustain a democratic government.
Although the 1995 elections in Haiti acted as the most important piece in the Clinton
administration’s plans for democratizing the island nation, they were carried out in a way that
limited citizenship association and informed participation, both necessary for a successful and
functional government. In the municipal and legislative elections that were held in the summer of
1995, a million electoral cards went missing, the Provisional Electoral Council confirmed the
existence of fraud in the voter registration process, and because the elections were hastily put in
place before the citizens could be properly educated about their new government, there was a
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low voter turnout of less than 20 percent.91 Thus, a scheduled election does not necessarily
guarantee democratic conduct or participation. Additionally, in the following Presidential
election in December 1995, President Préval received an even lower voter turnout of only 15
percent. This was because the election occurred when Aristide was at peak popularity in Haiti.
The low turnout reflected the Haitian people’s aversion to electing a new president (despite
Haiti’s constitutionally mandated five-year presidential terms) when they believed Aristide
should be able to serve an additional three years in office to account for the amount of time the
Cédras regime had taken from him.92 Although a UN report claimed “the electoral process,
which culminated with the election of President Préval on December 17 1995, has provided Haiti
with newly elected democratic institutions,” it seems clear that labeling Haiti a true democracy
was for the benefit of Clinton’s foreign policy legacy.93 Préval was a choice that did not
represent any political change, as he was also from Aristide’s Lavalas party, but significantly
less popular than his counterpart. Focusing on the surface indications of democracy, the election
of Aristide and subsequent transition of power to President Préval in 1996 signified to the
Clinton administration, and the larger community, that democracy had arrived in the island
nation. According to a popular news source in Haiti, however, democracy was “on course
without the people.”94 Democracy requires much more than two elections. Operation Uphold
Democracy failed to support the aspects of a democratic government that extended beyond an
elected President and Parliament.
When the final agreed-upon round of municipal and Parliamentary elections was held in
the spring of 1997, less than 10 percent of the electorate voted. To make matters worse, President
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Préval’s Prime Minister, Rosny Smarth, faced widespread criticism due to his neo-liberal
economic policies, and resigned on June 9 1997, leaving Haiti without a functioning Parliament
fort the next two years. Upon Smarth’s departure however, due to promises of a limited time
commitment in Haiti, the UN mandate and all US involvement in the country had ceased.95 The
United States had abandoned Haiti without ensuring sustained freedoms of expression and
person, civil society’s ability to participate politically, control of force, strong political
leadership, security, legitimacy, and stability, or rule of law. All this, while fully acknowledging
that, “the political crisis continues unresolved.”96 Finally, in January of 1999, five years after
Clinton had declared democracy in Haiti, President Préval dissolved Parliament and appointed
his own Prime Minister, effectively running the country by dictatorial decree.97 Clearly,
democracy had ceased to function in Haiti, along with its Constitution. Without a lasting and
legitimate constitution, there can be no democracy.
Operation Uphold Democracy did not succeed. Despite efforts to conduct elections,
create a police force, and restructure the economy, it is evident that, due to a misunderstanding of
the requirements of democracy and its necessary institutions, an insufficient time commitment,
and a failure to acknowledge the existing structural obstacles to democracy in the island nation,
the United States failed to successfully democratize Haiti. As we shall see in the next chapter, ten
years later, George W. Bush and his neoliberal, neoconservative administration neglected these
past lessons during the Iraq War and subsequent democratization efforts, ultimately leaving the
country in worse condition than when the United States invaded.
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III. IRAQ
On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush coined the term “axis of evil” in his State
of the Union Address, an excerpt of which is reproduced below:
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi
regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a
decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own
citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime
that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime
that has something to hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave
and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means
to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the
materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction.
We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies
from sudden attack.
And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's
security.98
A little over a year later, in March of 2003, the Bush administration invaded Iraq on the basis of
protecting the United States from Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs),
preemptively guarding against the state’s connection to the terrorist group Al Qaeda, and for the
promotion of democracy in the Middle East. When it became clear that there were no WMDs to
be found, and no evidence of the Iraq’s connection to Al Qaeda, the only remaining justification
for the Iraq War was the claim that the United States could bring democracy to Iraq and liberate
its people from years of brutal, autocratic rule. Unfortunately, due to an inadequate
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understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a misguided implementation
strategy, and a total failure to sufficiently support the hastily constructed democratic institutions
in the state, the United States again failed to successfully democratize a foreign country.
The analysis of the Iraq case will continue in a similar manner to that of the Haiti case,
focusing primarily on the United States’ democratization efforts in Iraq as opposed to its war
efforts and strategy from 2003-2011. Thus, the sections comprising this chapter will proceed
guided by the structure laid out in chapter one according to our democracy scholars. First, I will
present and analyze Iraq’s political, social, and economic conditions prior to invasion as they
relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. Second, I will examine the
United States’ actions in the years leading up to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the
involvement of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), analyzing the Obstacles to
Democracy that the Bush administration both created and faced in light of the conditions in Iraq.
Finally, I will provide an analysis of the invasion and CPA’s aftermath, evaluating Iraq’s
fledgling “democracy” against the Universal Characteristics of Democracy previously identified
by our democratization scholars. This case will demonstrate that while the Bush administration
removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities
for democratic elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context
coupled with the United States’ military destruction of the existing institutions only lead to an
unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.

CONDITIONS IN IRAQ PRIOR TO INVASION
By examining Iraq’s history from its artificial and external inception in 1920 after the fall
of the Ottoman Empire, it can be seen that unfortunately, due to its harsh autocratic rule and
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politicized sectarian conflict, the state did not possess many of the Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy before the United States’ attempts at democratization. Politically,
Iraq has not been successful in developing a democratic culture, nor had its autocratic
governments inspired trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Socially, Iraq is divided
along ethno-religious lines, making it nearly impossible for civil society organizations that foster
democracy to bridge sectarian divides. It is a country with a heterogeneous society, which
scholars such as Dahl and Huntington argue impedes the development of democracy.
Economically, while Iraq was eventually able to develop a functioning market economy due to
its vast oil resources, the sanctions placed upon it following the Gulf War in 1991 created
irreparable damage to the state’s institutions and its ability to provide basic human necessities to
its people. If we recall, both Huntington and Lipset contend that a state’s economic levels are
consequential in its development of democracy. As we have seen, the more internal
characteristics associated with democracy a state lacks (democratic political culture, vibrant civil
society, and a stable economy, for example) the more difficult it will be for the state in question
to develop democracy. Iraq is no exception to this long-standing pattern.
Iraq is an artificially constructed state, and like Haiti, its political past can be
characterized as mostly autocratic, oppressive, and violent. The British, following the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire, drew its borders arbitrarily in 1920. With the creation of the Iraqi state,
the British appointed the Hashemite Faisal bin Hussein as the new King, starting the long
tradition of the British appointing almost exclusively Sunni Arab elite to government and
ministry positions.99 While there was an early demand for independence during the Great Iraqi
Revolution (May—November, 1920), the British did not grant independence to Iraq until 1932.
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For the next 20 years, the monarchy struggled, facing stagnant per capita income and human
development due to Britain’s continued control of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Despite the
deplorable levels of poverty within the country, Iraq received little in exchange for its most
precious resource for the first two decades after its inception until the 1950s when oil revenues
increased.100 According to a World Bank report from 1952, despite being rich in oil and natural
resources, most of Iraq was impoverished, with an extremely low standard of living and
considerable unemployment plaguing the state. The report assessed that almost 90 percent of the
population was illiterate, and subject to diseases such as malaria, hookworm, and bilharzia as
Iraq’s housing and sanitation for the most part were primitive. Additionally, much of the
available water was wasted owing to a lack of storage and regulation, contributing to the poor
agricultural output.101 In short: Iraq was failing.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that in 1958, in response to the dire state of things in Iraq,
the monarchy was deposed in a violent military coup led by General Abed al-Karim Qasim and
Abdul Salam Arif in what is now known as the July 14th revolution. Qasim and his Free Officers
established Iraq as a republic, intending to completely overhaul society through social,
legislative, and economic reform.102 Although important efforts were made at developing
infrastructure, such as the construction of roads, dams, and bridges, in addition to creation of an
educated middle class, this revolution marked the beginning of a 45-year period of autocratic
rule, which was naturally detrimental to Iraq’s strength of civil society, its political culture, and
the government’s levels of legitimacy. The few trappings of democracy that accompanied the
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revolution gradually slipped away over the next decade as various civilian and military groups
vied for control of the state through regional and ethnic revolts, brutal suppressions, and the
banning or purging of political parties all together.103 With this oppression of civil society and
the subsequent flattening of any political opposition, Iraq’s organic chance at democracy was
never realized. It then follows that Iraqis failed to develop any sense of democratic political
belief or culture. Iraq’s absence of democratic history thus substantially diminished its prospects
for democratization.
Another exhibit of instability and violence within Iraq, and the catalyst for Saddam
Hussein’s eventual rise to power, was the Baath party’s conquest of the government in July of
1968. The Iraqi Baath party was first established in Syria in the 1940s, only forming an Iraqi
branch in 1952. Traditionally, its platform was built on Pan-Arab ideology, favoring unity for the
Arab people, socialism, and the freedom for Iraq to determine its own path.104 The Baath party
was not always a Sunni-dominated organization: it still included 54 percent Shia membership
from 1952 to 1963, but from 1963 to 1970, that number was reduced to 6 percent.105 Thus, the
party became known for its exclusion from power on the basis of ethno-religious background and
its strong contempt for democracy, exhibited by the Baathists’ assassinations of leading members
of the Iraqi government, their series of executions of rival dissenters in a reign of terror, and their
elimination of all forms of opposition.106 All told, the new Baathist party arrested, tortured, and
executed an estimated 3,000 members of the Iraqi Communist Party in an attempt to terrify the
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Iraqi people into subservience.107 Finally, when General Saddam Hussein rose to power in 1979,
a member of the Baath party, the government’s system of oppression only became worse.
It is especially important to examine Hussein’s regime, as his was the regime that
preceded the United States’ invasion in 2003, and subsequent attempt at democratization. With
his presidency, Iraq transitioned from an autocratic state to a personal cult with a despotic regime
that was dependent on Saddam Hussein and his close family members and cohorts. Thus, what
little pluralism and balance that remained in the highest echelons of Iraqi government completely
disappeared.108 Elevated to General of the Iraqi Armed Forces in 1976, Saddam became the de
facto leader of Iraq years before his official presidency in 1979, during which time he
consolidated his power over the government and the Baath party. The state became increasingly
centered on Saddam as he eliminated rivals brutally: this included the execution of key members
of the governing council within days of his inauguration, imprisonment of ministry officials, and
mass executions of Communist and Dawa Party activists. This was done in an attempt to crush
any kind of opposition to Saddam, completely eliminating any possibility for civil society
organization or a democratic political culture.
Overall, Saddam’s rule was typified by extreme levels of spying, intimidation,
oppression, and torture carried out by the Jihaz al-Amn al-Khaass (The Special Security
Organization).109 The secret police, known as the Mukhabarat, encouraged civilians to denounce
family members, friends, or anyone who was close to them who might be deemed a threat to
Saddam’s rule.110 It was essentially forbidden to question any of Saddam’s inhumane actions.
These policies were financed by Iraq’s increasing oil wealth, which, however profitable, was
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ultimately unsustainable as the power was concentrated largely in the hands of a single
individual.111 Despite the economy’s growth in the 1970s, oil revenues consolidated the
hegemony of the political elite by providing it with the necessary financial resources to
strengthen its agenda.112 Essentially, the wealth Iraq collected in the 1970s was unavailable to the
majority of its population. Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq war itself (1980-1988), Saddam
Hussein’s policies caused over 100,000 people to be killed within his own state, and over a
million people to be displaced.113 Two years later, Iraq faced yet another armed conflict when
Saddam invaded Kuwait and the United States responded. The ensuing Gulf War, which lasted
until 1991, resulted in further consequences for the Iraqi people. To illustrate this point, it is
estimated that in the uprising within Iraq following the Gulf War, between 20,000 and 100,000
civilians died, in addition to the 15,000 to 30,000 Kurds who died in refugee camps.114 For
almost a quarter century, an entire generation in Iraq knew nothing but harsh autocratic rule that
crushed civil society, worsened economic prospects, and decreased legitimacy of government as
well as any chance at organically fostering a democratic political culture.
Equally as important as Iraq’s political history is Iraq’s ethno-religious sectarian conflict,
as Iraq has always been a religiously and ethnically divided country. In 1932, the year of its
independence, its population was made up of 21 percent Sunni Arabs, 14 percent Sunni Kurds,
53 percent Shia Arabs, 5 percent non-Muslim Arabs, and the final 6 percent composed of other
religious groups.115 These three main sects—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Kurds—create
the lines upon which Iraq is divided. King Faisal even proclaimed in 1932: “I have to say that it
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is my belief that there is no Iraqi people inside Iraq. There are only diverse groups with no
national sentiments.”116 While it is true that for the majority of the time, Sunnis and Shia live
side by side without fighting, their sectarian identities always played a role in politics, as
Parliamentary lines followed ethno-religious preference. Saddam enforced these sectarian
divisions with horrific levels of violence, hardening the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish identities and
flattening any kind of resistance within the country. With a Sunni minority in a position of power
within an oppressive government for almost 100 years, the Shia and Kurdish communities
experienced increasing levels of antagonism (especially from Saddam’s regime) to the alreadyexisting sectarian tension.117 Iraq’s neighbors have also intensified the conflict, using the ethnic
and religious divides to advance their own agendas. Iraq is thus largely held together by its
artificial borders as it has never been ethnically, religiously, or culturally homogenous, another
characteristic associated with democracy. While the United States itself is an exception to Dahl’s
observation that democracies will develop more easily in homogenous countries, Iraq—in
addition to its sectarian divides—faces further obstacles to democracy, such as its lack of
democratic experience and its illegitimate government, that all together inhibit its ability to
successfully democratize.
Today, the majority of the Kurdish population in Iraq resides in the state’s three most
northern provinces, a region which is unofficially regarded as Kurdistan. In fact, when Iraq was
first created, the Kurds sought autonomy on educational, linguistic, cultural, and other matters,
but were largely ignored for decades.118 The Kurds wished for their own country, and felt
slighted by being labeled a minority in the predominantly Arab Iraq. Indeed, after a decade of
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violent conflict in the 1960s, on March 28 1970 the Kurds were acknowledged as a political
party with a Constitutional amendment that would recognize the Kurdish population as one of
the main components of the Iraqi nation and would allow for the Kurdish language to be
recognized as an official language alongside Arabic.119 Four years later, in 1974, the Kurds were
extended regional autonomous privileges by Baghdad, although it remained clear that all
legislation emanating from the region had to exist “within the state’s general policy,” thus
placing the Kurds in a position of subservience to the Arab population in Iraq.120 This decision,
while initially beneficial for the Kurds, established the principle of decentralization in Iraq that
would later be reflected in the United States’ construction of government, and eventually
contribute to the failure of Bush’s democratization experiment in the Middle East. It is important
to note here that this would not be a reflection of Lijphart’s Consociational Democracy, as the
Kurds did not have true control over their own domestic issues. Additionally, the ethno-religious
groups in Iraq do not all face a single external threat, and thus the political elites are not
compelled to come together in a cartel to govern the state together. With the rise of Saddam’s
Baathist party in 1974, the Sunni minority again imposed a brutal authoritarian regime upon
Kurdish and Shia populations.121
Tensions were only exacerbated throughout Iraq due to the devastation of the Iran-Iraq
war, extending from 1980 until 1988, and the Gulf War, lasting from 1990 to 1991. Saddam
Hussein initiated the Iran-Iraq war as an attempt to re-assert dominance over border territories
between the two states: in particular, the debate over the sovereignty of the Shatt al-‘Arab, a river
formed at the meeting of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that was historically the border between
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Iran and Iraq. While the United States initially supported Iraq during the war, its international
standing was damaged when Saddam used chemical weapons on Iraqi-Kurdish civilians, the
majority of whom supported Iran in the war. Kurdistan was thus devastated during the Iran-Iraq
war with massive killings at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime, as exemplified by the
attack on Halabjah in March 1988, where approximately 5,000 Kurdish civilians were killed.122
Even though Kurdistan was given protection after the Gulf War with a U.S.-mandated no-fly
zone under Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the ethnic violence
and brutalization of the Kurds at the hands of the Baathists, which lasted for years, prevented
Kurdistan from fully transitioning to a semi-autonomous state. The Gulf War also gave rise to
obscene violence against the Shia Arabs in Iraq, who were encouraged by the United States to
rise up against Saddam’s dictatorship, but when they did they were met with subsequent
repression and violence.123 Iraq’s lack of ethnic, cultural, or religious homogeneity, while only
one aspect under consideration in its struggle for democracy, is certainly an important factor. If
we recall, democracy scholars argue that a heterogeneous society is characteristically less likely
to develop democracy. This fact, coupled with Saddam’s efforts to destroy any kind of civil
society organizations that were seen as a danger to his regime, or representative of intersectional
communities within Iraq, makes it that much more difficult for the state to develop or maintain
any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.124
As we have discussed, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War aggravated the alreadyexisting sectarian divides within Iraq, creating an extremely polarized society upon which the
United States attempted to develop democracy. However, these two wars, with the addition of
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the resulting economic sanctions, also devastated Iraq’s economy, another important indicator
associated with democratization. Under Saddam’s rule, economic data were considered state
secrets, thus much of the reliable data for the era was eliminated. It is estimated, however, that
before the Gulf War, oil accounted for more than 60 percent of the country’s GDP (but only
employs 2-3 percent of the labor force) and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings. The CIA’s
economic intelligence unit estimates that Iraq’s GDP stood at roughly $38 billion in 1989 due to
the state’s rapidly growing oil wealth since its nationalization of oil in 1972.125 Additionally,
unlike most Gulf States, Iraq has considerable agricultural potential: about 12 percent of its land
is arable, of which 4 percent is irrigated. Another 9 percent is suitable for grazing, and 3 percent
is forested.126 This agricultural potential was not realized during Saddam’s regime, however, as
most economic efforts were focused on the production of oil, as evidenced by the following
excerpt from the 2004 Economic Intelligence Unit:
Under the Ba’ath party, activity in the food and agriculture sectors of the economy
continued to decline. Government expenditures on agriculture dropped from 18 percent
of total government expenditures in 1976 to less than 10 percent in 1980 and continued to
decline during the Iran-Iraq war. Under Saddam, as a result of drought, lack of inputs,
poor methods and weak administration, Iraq was unable to achieve agricultural
production levels near its potential. Following the first Gulf war, the irrigation systems
fell into disrepair and much of the irrigated cropland in central and southern Iraq was
badly damaged by salinization. Rapid population growth during the past three decades,
coupled with limited arable land and an overall stagnation in agricultural production has
steadily increased Iraq’s dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs.127
Unlike Haiti, due to its natural resources, Iraq could have had the economic development levels
that Lipset and Huntington say are required for a democracy. Instead, however, its economic
potential was undermined by Saddam’s rule. It can thus be seen that Iraq was struggling
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economically even before the United Nations imposed the harsh sanctions on the state in an
effort to punish Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait.
In August of 1990, the UN Security Council imposed the most comprehensive and
restricting sanctions regime ever devised (to date) in order to coerce Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait. After the war ended, however, these sanctions remained in place until 2003, and were
only modified in 1996 with the United Nation’s Oil for Food program (UNOFF). The initial
sanctions, instituted by UN Security Council Resolution 687, mandated that Iraq could not
import or export anything for any reason, reducing the country to beggar status while leaving its
senior leadership virtually unscathed, as it was discovered that Saddam pocketed at least $1.8
billion at the expense of Iraqis suffering under the UN sanctions.128 Iraqis were hungry and sick
as public sector salaries were cut to around $2 per month, poverty rates grew, and basic
medicines ceased to be available. Without oil export revenues, the Iraqi government could not
allocate any funds to education, transportation, housing, or infrastructure for over a decade.129
Although Iraq’s economic prowess early on would suggest high levels of urbanization and
education (Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy), these factors were marred and
stunted by these devastating economic sanctions, further inhibiting democracy.
Dennis Halliday, a former UN humanitarian coordinator placed in Iraq to monitor the Oil
for Food program, contended that the economic sanctions constituted “genocide” due to their
responsibility for the deaths of thousands each month in Iraq, and their exposure of millions of
people to starvation or malnutrition, and sickness.130 As the UN Security Council would not
allow oil revenues to be spent on the repair of infrastructure, there was no way for Iraq to
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adequately repair water, power, or sewage systems critical in the battle to save lives of infants
and children. Funding was also not available for the reequipping of hospitals. With these factors
in mind, Halliday argues: “with or without original intent, the impact of economic sanctions
constitutes genocide.”131 Thus, the Iraqi state inherited by the US-led occupation force in 2003
had already been dramatically weakened by the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the corresponding
economic sanctions, the ensuing delegitimization of government, and finally the invasion
itself.132 As argued by our democracy scholars, this economic failure (contributing to low levels
of education and urbanization) again inhibits and sometimes even prevents democratization. It is
clear that in the years leading up to the 2003 invasion, Iraq encompassed characteristics that are
extremely unfavorable to democracy: insurgency, illegitimacy of government, violence, ethnic
rivalry, economic failure and harsh autocratic rule. Even before the United States invaded Iraq in
2003, the state possessed structural obstacles to democratization that prevented it from
developing any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.

PLANNING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ: THE INVASION AND THE ACTIONS OF THE CPA (2003-2004)
The Bush administration both created and faced many of the Obstacles to Democracy
and Democratization in its planning and implementation of liberal democracy in Iraq. These
obstacles resulted from Bush’s failure to view Iraq as distinct and unique, separate from his
desires for a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Middle East. His administration did not take
into account Iraq’s political, ethno-religious, and economic conditions prior to the invasion.
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Additionally, the planners viewed the removal of Saddam as the equivalent to the creation of
democracy in Iraq, forgetting that Iraq has had a total lack of democratic experience, or any
previous political commitment to democratic values. This section will analyze the Obstacles to
Democracy with the structure and characteristics identified in chapter one, and previously
applied to Haiti. As we will see, the CPA’s actions in Iraq after the initial invasion only
exacerbated the divides within society, failed to alleviate poverty in the provinces outside of
Baghdad, and dramatically increased levels of violence in the state due to the insurgency as a
reaction to the United States’ actions; all obstacles to democratization according to scholars such
as Dahl, Huntington, Zakaria, and Whitehead. Most importantly, the United States again viewed
elections as the final step in a militarized democratization effort, failing to design a mission with
the necessary time and scope for successful democratization, and thus leading to a collapse of a
hastily and poorly constructed “democratic” government in Iraq.

Obstacles to Democracy: Planning for Iraq
It would be impossible to analyze the United States’ attempted democratization of Iraq
without examining President Bush’s stated reasons for the intervention. While it is widely
acknowledged that the Bush administration’s economic concerns over oil, and its security
concerns regarding terrorism were key motivators for invading Iraq in 2003, what is more
relevant to this thesis is the Bush administration’s belief that exporting democracy to Iraq would
not only be easy, but that it would also lead to a larger wave of freedom throughout the Middle
East. In the years and months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration pivoted
from a strategy of containment (of Iraq) to a strategy of preemption in the Middle East. Up until
2003, the United States had been content to contain Saddam Hussein with multilateral economic
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sanctions put in place by the UN. However, this strategy was replaced with the Bush Doctrine in
light of the events of 9/11, which favored preemptive strikes against known enemies, unilateral
action, military preeminence, and the promotion of democratic regime change.133
9/11 provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to enact its agenda, bolstered by
the neoconservative security argument for going to war in Iraq that had been brewing since the
1990s. The neoconservative movement’s central interest was America’s role in global security,
with a unified goal for the U.S. to eliminate threats to the security of America and its allies. They
were also influenced by the Wilsonian tradition of making the world safe for democracy.134 After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, at the start of what many thought to be a “new world order,”
Francis Fukuyama’s claim that the triumph of Western liberal democracy signified the “end of
history” was a harbinger of later, rather ethnocentric arguments that the exporting of Western
ideals (democracy and capitalism) would serve the larger interests of humanity.135
A full decade before the plans were drawn to invade Iraq, this theme of exporting
Western liberal democracy can be seen in Paul Wolfowitz, “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay
Khalizad’s “Defense Planning Guidance” document, as requested by Defense Secretary Richard
Cheney in 1992. Wolfowitz would go on to become Donald Rumsfeld’s Deputy Secretary of
Defense in 2001, with Libby serving as Cheney’s chief of staff. The document advocates for the
United States to show the leadership necessary to establish and protect this new world order, to
address sources of regional conflict and instability, to promote democracy and free markets
globally, and to retain “preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which
threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle
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international relations.”136 Emphasized primarily in the list of U.S. interests is the protection of
Persian Gulf Oil, connecting Iraq to these ideas of exporting democracy to protect U.S. interests.
This document was later incorporated into the Project for the New American Century, and then
brought back into the administration when they returned as policy makers under George W.
Bush, helping to construct his National Security Strategy of 2002. Wolfowitz himself called for
the overthrow of Saddam as early as November of 1997, stating that the U.S. should not “be
afraid to go after targets that constitute the support of Saddam’s regime” with a “willingness to
act unilaterally…because the international consensus is weak.”137 Finally, in early 2000,
Condoleezza Rice—Bush’s National Security Advisor at the time of the invasion—outlined a
post-Cold War foreign policy that argued above all, “the next president must be comfortable with
America’s special role as the world’s leader,” words that anticipated Bush’s freedom agenda in
the coming years.138 This confidence in the United States’ ideals would only increase during
Bush’s presidency, where he leveraged the emotional devastation from 9/11 to further his
administration’s interests to democratize Iraq in what he and his advisors believed would be the
first step in democratizing the Middle East.
The Bush administration’s insistence that Iraq was a threat to world peace made Saddam
Hussein the focal point around which the neoconservatives could reorganize world politics
through the construction of a war that had little support globally to militarily democratize Iraq.
Scholars such as David Beetham and Fareed Zakaria, who are referenced in the literature review,
argue that even the concept of militarized democratization itself is an obstacle to democracy, as it
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undermines the very nature of democracy and its concepts of freedom and self-determination.139
The Bush administration propagated the view that pro-western democracy can be created,
manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries—even when there seems to be little evidence
for its success in any historical or structural sense. This confidence is shown again and again in
the planning and implementation of the Iraq War, thus reinforcing the concept of militarized
democracy, which as we know, is actually a known obstacle to democracy.
The infamous Downing Street Memo, written a little under a year before the invasion of
Iraq, and months before the United States would ask the UN Security Council to authorize
renewed weapons inspections, noted “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action,
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy.”140 The United States, from the planning to the execution of the
invasion, lacked the legitimacy needed to successfully democratize Iraq. According to the UN
(Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the desire for regime change is not a legal basis for military
action. Furthermore, the United States could not claim self-defense: Iraq was not threatening its
neighbors, nor was its military capability any greater than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran.141
Most importantly, Bush failed to receive authorization for the use of force from the UN Security
Council. One month later, however, Cheney confidently announced, “there is no doubt that
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to
use against our friends, against our allies, and against us… With our help a liberated Iraq can be
a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited
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potential for a peaceful, prosperous future.”142 In October of the same year, the Bush
administration received the proper authorization from Congress for the use of force in Iraq.
Regardless of the lack of multilateral approval, the only thing that mattered in this new
world order was U.S. military power and the ability to use it preemptively. By the time President
Bush announced the beginning of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in March of 2003, Saddam Hussein
and his WMD’s had become the public justification for unilateral, militarized democratization. In
his announcement to the world concerning the start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” President
Bush assured his viewers that “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and
restore control of that country to its own people.”143 Whether or not this is actually true, it is
important to note the administration’s connections to oil companies such as Chevron and
Halliburton, which accompanied the administration’s belief that bringing democracy and free
markets to Iraq would be beneficial to America’s economy and security.144 Despite the Bush
administration’s confidence that democracy could easily be exported to Iraq, the plans for its
democratization never considered Iraq’s unique social, political, or economic contexts, or the
fact that Iraq had a distinct absence of democratic experience, a characteristic that scholars argue
is a key obstacle to democracy. President Bush and his administration simply assumed that with
the removal of Saddam, the U.S. military would be seen as liberators, evidenced by Vice
President Cheney, who when asked to discuss the invasion, bluntly responded: “My belief is we
will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”145 The Bush administration considered Saddam to be
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Iraq’s only obstacle to democracy, thus ignoring other important Obstacles to Democracy and
Democratization in Iraq itself, such as its absence of democratic experience, its divided society,
its poverty, and its lack of stability.
Bush’s desire to democratize Iraq was misguided from the start: a woeful lack of
historical understanding combined with ideas of Western superiority led his administration to
believe that it could waltz into Iraq, democratize the state for the benefit of the United States, and
wrap things up before it got too messy. There is clearly a gap between the Bush administration’s
declared policies—wrapped in moral discourse—and the realities of its proposed actions.146 The
Bush administration propagated the view that pro-Western democracy can be created,
manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries, even when there seems to be little evidence
for its success in any historical or structural sense when considering Iraq itself.

Obstacles to Democracy: The Actions of the CPA (March 2003—June 2004)
In order to go about democratizing Iraq, the Pentagon established the Office for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) on January 20, 2003, two months before
Bush sent troops into Iraq. OHRA reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and was headed by Ret. Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, who had helped coordinate relief operations in
northern Iraq after the first Gulf War. However, Garner’s initial desire to rely on local Iraqis and
his refusal to abolish the Baath party led to the Defense Department dissolving OHRA on April
21 2003.147 OHRA was then replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), lead by L.
Paul Bremer, who served from May 11 2003 to June 28 2004, the date when the U.S. occupying
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forces restored limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government. Douglas Feith, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Head of the Office of Special Plans, expected that the
reconstruction of the Iraqi government would be easy—lasting no more ninety days—since
grateful Iraqis would greet the Americans as liberators. Feith’s optimism was also shared by
Preside Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security
Advisor Rice.148 This clearly signifies an insufficient time commitment to the growth of
democratic institutions, a characteristics that Whitehead argues is one of our Obstacles to
Democracy and Democratization. In actuality the CPA’s occupation lasted over a year, and the
United States left Iraq well before it had accomplished the goals that it had put forth. As revealed
in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feith did not want to waste time
“theorizing” what to do, as he intended the CPA to be an “expeditionary” office relying on
practical work.149 Thus, rather than a carefully thought out developmental project to achieve
lasting democratic institutions, the CPA’s construction presented a lack of nuanced
understanding of democracy and its requirements from the very start.
As we now know, due to a series of mistaken assumptions, almost everything in Iraq
post-invasion had to be reconstructed: army and police, governmental ministries, banking and
education systems, and basic infrastructure for delivering and generating electricity and water,
handling sewage, and producing and delivering oil.150 The United States did not have sufficient
plans in place for rebuilding Iraq post-invasion: thus, hopes for organizing a pro-U.S. liberal
democracy and privatizing Iraq’s economy collapsed.
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Paul Bremer’s actions leading the CPA in his first few months in Baghdad only served to
further damage the state, dividing Iraq’s society, creating violence that lead to the insurgency
against the U.S. military, and undermining the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government by
unilaterally controlling the key executive, judicial, and legislative decisions made early on. In
short: with its poor planning, the United States helped to create significant Obstacles to
Democracy and Democratization in Iraq rather than cultivating an environment conducive to
democratization. In Orders 1 and 2, issued on May 16 and May 23 of 2003, respectively, Bremer
gutted the governmental and military institutions that existed in Iraq, leaving behind no
institutional memory and little stability or legitimacy (obstacles to democracy). These orders
were made against the judgment of Jay Garner, the senior CIA officer in Iraq, and against the
advice of military planners. Additionally, Bremer acted without consultation with Secretary of
State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Myers, Vice Chair Peter Pace, General McKiernan, CIA Director George Tenet, or
Intelligence Community lead for the Middle East Paul Pillar.151 Guided by the notion that the
removal of all things related to Saddam Hussein’s regime would end Iraq’s problems, Bremer’s
initial policies politically cleansed the state.152 His intentions are made clear in the infamous
CPA Orders 1 and 2, which dissolved and dismantled the Iraqi state, removing everything and
everyone associated with the Baath Party.153 This decision effectively eliminated the leadership
and top technical capacity for universities, hospitals, transportation, electricity, and
communications, weakening the existing infrastructure and institutions within the state,
demonstrating again how the United States helped to create Obstacles to Democracy within Iraq.
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While Bremer claimed that the order would only affect 20,000 people, the total amounted to
more than 100,000, including approximately 40,000 schoolteachers who had joined the Baath
party only to keep their jobs.154 The second order was even more devastating, as the members of
the security forces in Iraq amounted to over 385,000, all of whom were now also jobless and
angry. The following is a list of the “Dissolved Entities” from CPA Order 2:155
The Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Information
The Ministry of State for Military Affairs
The Iraqi Intelligence Service
The National Security Bureau
The Directorate of National Security
The Special Security Organization
The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defense Force, and other regular military services
The Republican Guard
The Special Republican Guard
The Directorate of Military Intelligence
The Al Quds Force
Emergency Forces
All Paramilitaries
The Presidential Diwan
The Presidential Secretariat
The National Assembly
The Youth Organization
National Olympic Committee
Not only did these orders alienate hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who were now jobless,
but they also created a security vacuum, which allowed for the development of a violent
insurgency—characteristics that our scholars have identified as Obstacles to Democracy and
Democratization. Clearly, the massive extent to which Bremer cleansed the Iraqi state reveals a
failure to preserve any existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, severely reducing Iraq’s

154
155

	
  

Pfiffner, "US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army." 80
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, May 23 2003.

76

chances at democratization.156 What is so tragic about these first two orders is that under
Garner’s guidance, they were never supposed to occur. According to Colin Powell, a very
different plan had been approved previously at the highest level:
When we went in, we had a plan, which the President approved. We would not break up
and disband the Iraqi army. We would use the reconstituted army with purged leadership
to help us secure and maintain order throughout the country. We would dissolve the
Baath party, the ruling political party, but we would not throw every party member out on
the street.157
In addition to this, Bremer’s actions worsened Iraq’s economic situation and made clear that the
United States was not interested in including the views of the Sunni minority because it was
tainted with the memory of the Baath Party. In his memoirs, Bremer reaffirmed his belief that
Iraq’s democratization process was analogous to the democratization and reconstruction efforts
in Germany and Japan post-WWII, stating “we had to build a success story here that, like
Germany and Japan, still looked good after fifty years,” again failing to realize that Iraq is unique
in its historical context.158 Most people in Iraq thus saw the war as an occupation rather than a
liberation, and rightfully so: by October 2003, a poll was conducted in Baghdad that revealed
only 4.6 percent of the population saw the United States as liberators or peace keepers.159 Again,
we see that the Bush administration had little understanding of the political and historical
realities that dominated the region.
The CPA’s next step was to draft a constitution, and Paul Bremer’s first impulse was to
appoint a drafting committee that would write the document and organize a government friendly
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to the United States. The Iraqis, however, would not allow the United States to completely co-opt
the democratization process. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior cleric in Shia Islam,
issued a Fatwa in June of 2003 stating that only elected experts should be involved in composing
the new constitution. The Fatwa strongly asserted that, “there must be a general election so that
every Iraqi citizen—who is eligible to vote—can choose someone to represent him in a
foundational Constitutional preparation assembly.”160 This moment signified a rare instance in
the history of the CPA where Bremer chose to change course: on July 13th of the same year, the
CPA announced a 25 member Iraq Governing Council (IGC), whose purpose would be to serve
as the provisional government. The Council was charged with drafting a temporary constitution
that would organize elections for a national assembly, write a permanent constitution, and
establish a sovereign government. However, the 25 members promoted to the IGC were
apportioned according to a strict ethnic and religious groupings, effectively forcing the council to
function based on identity politics, which only served to increase sectarian tensions throughout
the drafting process of the constitution.161 The way the CPA organized its democratization efforts
thus led to a radicalization of ethno-nationalist parties and an upward spiraling of their
demands.162 In addition to the existing sectarian tensions in Iraq, the United States was complicit
in further dividing Iraq’s society, thus helping to create identifiable obstacles to democracy
within the state.
Bremer approached the rest of the CPA’s timeline with a set of seven steps that would, he
claimed, ultimately lead to sovereignty. The first step, as discussed previously, was the creation
of the IGC. Reproduced below is Bremer’s list of steps:
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1. Creating a 25 member Governing Council broadly representative of Iraqi society.
2. Appointing a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution.
3. Appointing ministers who serve at the pleasure of the Governing Council with the
purpose of setting policy.
4. Writing Iraq’s new constitution.
5. Popular ratification of the constitution.
6. Election of a government. When that government is elected, Iraq will have a
government designed and selected by Iraqis. It will be unique in Iraq’s history and
will send a powerful message about democracy to other countries in the region.
7. Dissolving the Coalition authority, which will follow naturally on the heels of the
election. The coalition authority will then yield the remainder of its authority to a now
sovereign Iraq.163
There can be no greater certainty that Bremer, the CPA, and the Bush administration viewed
elections as the final step in democratization. Such thinking, as we know, can be a major obstacle
to achieving democracy. Additionally, there is no mention in this list of fostering a politically
informed civil society, or strong rule of law, characteristics necessary for a functional and
successful democracy. Furthermore, Bremer failed to clear this list with the State Department,
Defense Department, or the White House, all of which were very concerned with the possibility
of a long occupation and promptly instructed Bremer to drop his plans and focus on a rapid
transfer to sovereignty: the new deadline for transfer of sovereignty was to be no later than June
30, 2004.164 This deadline conveniently preceded the upcoming mid-term elections that coming
November in the United States, where the administration itself would be tested. Bush wanted a
victory, and he viewed the transition of governance from the CPA to Iraq as signifying freedom
and democracy for Iraq. We know that this was not in fact the case. It is evident that the United
States exhibited an insufficient time commitment to the construction of a functional democracy
from the start in favor of a quick and easy “victory.”

163
164

	
  

Paul Bremer, “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty,” Washington Post, September 3, 2003
Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Sayej, The Iraq Papers, 193

79

In November of 2003, the CPA began its work on Iraq’s interim constitution, as
designated in step four of Bremer’s plan, which would later be known as the Transitional
Administrative Law, or TAL when it was officially issued on March 8, 2004.165 This was the
step in the CPA’s timeline, however, that would prove to be Bremer’s undoing. Although the
CPA claimed that it would consult with the IGC on all matters, the drafting process of the
interim constitution was secretive, and ill-managed: the CPA appointed a small group of US
officials and academics and two Iraqi-American jurists to write TAL, which was first drafted in
English and only later translated to Arabic when it became necessary to share some of the
provisions with the IGC.166 TAL specified a series of rights, organized state institutions, and
established federal relations between the capital and the regions, most importantly recognizing a
measure of autonomy for the Kurds while “reserving control of fiscal, defense, and foreign
policy for Baghdad.”167 While the constitution attempted to centralize the provisional
government in a construction of liberal democracy, the initial organization of the IGC (based on
ethno-religious identity) would undermine the government as votes and decisions broke down
along sectarian lines. The vast majority of Iraq’s political class, including Dawa, the Sadrist
movement, the Iraqiya alliance, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, were not given a voice in the IGC.
The constitution advocated for federalism based on fundamentalism, not on legitimate
geographical areas.168 This process ultimately robbed legitimacy and authenticity of government
from the Iraqi people, sowing seeds of contention and protest early on.
Bremer must have been aware of the discontent of the Iraqis, however, as the day before
the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people, he issued CPA order 17, which gave
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immunity to all external actors involved in the attempted democratization of Iraq. Section two
goes as far as to explicitly state: “Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign
Liaison Missions, their personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants
shall be immune from Iraqi legal process,” thus excluding the offending parties from Iraq’s rule
of law.169 The United States created a safeguard to avoid responsibility for the mess it had
caused. On June 28, 2004, having accomplished only four of Bremer’s seven goals, the CPA was
succeeded by the collaborating interim Iraqi government, headed by Ayad Allawi, a secularized
Shiite. The transfer of power was conducted in secret, as the Bush administration feared a violent
reaction from the Iraqi people if the ceremony had been in public. While the United States had
caused a civil war in Iraq due to its occupation, resulting in increasing levels of violence,
instability, and division, the Iraqis were left alone to ratify a permanent constitution and elect a
new government in the hopes of achieving democracy. Bush’s invasion of Iraq aggravated the
country’s already-existing Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization, such as its absence of
democratic experience and divided society, as well as creating even more obstacles by
sabotaging any efforts to construct a democratic government as evidenced by the United States’
insufficient time commitment in Iraq, its exacerbation of violence through militarized
democratization, and its failure to view democracy as more than an election.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CPA: EVALUATING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ
This final section of the Iraq case evaluates “Operation Iraqi Freedom” after the transfer
of power from the CPA to the Iraqi people. It applies the Universal Characteristics of
Democracy, as identified previously in the theoretical section and discussed in the Haiti case, to
the failed state of democratization in Iraq. As we will see, Iraq’s lack of alignment with the
169
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Universal Characteristics of Democracy signifies the United States’ failure to successfully
democratize Iraq. The Bush administration (much like the Clinton administration did in its Haiti
intervention) viewed elections as the final step in the creation of a democracy, when in fact Iraq
was far from achieving a democratic government. From the very beginning, the creation of Iraq’s
constitution sabotaged its prospects for democracy—because the Iraqi people were not given full
control over their constitution, it cannot be seen as legitimate. Additionally, the Iraqi people did
not fully control the construction of their new government, minimizing the potential for strong
political leadership, legitimately representational parties, or stable democratic institutions.
Furthermore, with the dissolution and rapid re-creation of the Iraqi Army, the state did not have a
reliable control of force, contributing to the insurgency. Accordingly, the insurgency and civil
war then inhibited sustained freedom of expression and civil society organization and
participation in the new “democracy” due to the brutal violence it created. Iraq is a sobering
reminder that elections, while an important part of democracy, are not enough to constitute a
successful democratization effort. It is unfortunately clear that the majority of the Universal
Characteristics of Democracy were not met long-term in Iraq, in no small way due to the Bush
administration and CPA’s total failure to construct lasting democratic institutions that reflected a
nuanced understanding of Iraq’s unique political, social, and economic history.
While the majority of the analysis of the CPA’s actions occurred in the previous section,
the magnitude of its impact must also be considered. Therefore, this section will look at the years
following its exit from Iraq (2004—2006) to assess why, based on the identified Universal
Characteristics of Democracy, the Bush administration failed to achieve its goal of
democratizing Iraq. While the CPA passed the torch to the Iraqis in June of 2004, there are
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lingering legacies of destruction that arise not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole. As
we will see, the Bush administration’s early optimism regarding democracy Iraq was not viable.
Iraq held its first election after the CPA had left the country on January 30 2005 for
drafting the constitution, accompanied by provincial elections and the election of the regional
parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan. 11 months later, Iraq held a legislative election on December 15
2005. These elections reflected a clear pattern of ethno-sectarian preference—the Sunnis
boycotted the first election entirely, and the Shia and Kurds voted along ethno-religious lines,
indicating the CPA’s divisive construction of the government.170 Due to the construction of the
IGC and the constitution itself, this pattern of sectarian preference remained consistent in the
years following the CPA’s exit from Iraq, and as none of the three major ethno-religious groups
had a majority in the government, Iraq’s elected members would constantly have to work across
sectarian lines in order to get anything done.171 These patterns reaffirm the lack of legitimacy and
stability at the very core of Iraq’s new government: its constitution.
In the elections that occurred in December of 2005, Iraq elected al-Jaffari as Prime
Minister—this appointment, however, would not last long. The U.S. was unhappy with this turn
of events due to his close cooperation with Iran, his growing unpopularity with the Iraqi people,
and his failure to crack down on sectarian militias. Thus the Bush administration turned its
attention to Nouri al-Maliki.172 In May of 2006, the Bush administration backed Maliki and he
was elected the Prime Minister of Iraq. The United States would eventually regret supporting
Maliki so fiercely as after 2006, he slowly built a shadow state that circumvented both the
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existing governing elite and democratic oversight of the exercise of power.173 He placed his
office at the center of state power, reducing the ability of the cabinet and parliament to influence
policy—thus becoming more and more like an autocrat, and thus Iraq diminished as a
democracy. He even placed his family members within the ranks of his party—the Dawa party.
He appointed his son, Ahmed Maliki, as deputy chief of staff, giving him oversight across all of
Iraq’s security services. Continuing his path towards autocracy, Maliki used a renewed deBaathification as a means of disqualifying political opponents.174 Iraq’s new government was
repeating the actions of Hussein’s regime that had decimated the ability for civil society to
participate in a democratic process, or for legitimate political parties to exist in the political
sphere. Furthermore, while Iraq’s government was descending into corruption, the rest of the
state was caught up in a seemingly endless civil war, contributing to a loss of basic freedoms of
person, inclusive citizenship, and the rule of law. While elections are a universally agreed-upon
method for implementing democracy (not to mention one of the identified Universal
Characteristics of Democracy) for a democratic government to truly function, there is a need for
a wider set of democratic values, principles, and characteristics than the U.S. planned for in
Iraq’s fledgling “democracy.”
Iraq’s civil society organizations also suffered at the hands of the CPA, which had
focused almost exclusively on Baghdad (the center of Iraq’s oil production) while it ignored the
rest of Iraq’s provinces. Because of this focus on Baghdad and oil, the majority of Iraq was not
equally represented in its central government as it should have been in order for liberal
democracy to function successfully. Accordingly, a more authentic grassroots experience of
democracy through the provincial governorates was diluted and channeled through existing
173
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power structures created by the CPA in Baghdad, limiting a large number of citizens’ ability to
participate politically.175 While USAID sponsored some programs of engagement in civil
organizations in the Provincial Governorates in the outer regions, they were not integrated into,
nor had been allowed to influence, the top-level policy in Baghdad.176 Furthermore, the majority
of the USAID programs were being tasked with a strict neo-liberal economic agenda of
privatization at any cost in order to capitalize on oil, a sign of misdirected international funding
that actually worked to inhibit Iraq’s development of democracy.177 Given this poor integration
and communication between Baghdad, the International Zone of Baghdad otherwise known as
“The Green Zone,” and the rest of the country, there was a clear lack of inclusive citizenship
with the full ability to participate present during the United States’ occupation of Iraq. Worse
still, the violence (not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole) and civil war that followed
the invasion made it all the more difficult for Iraqi citizens to attain basic freedoms of person, let
alone the ability to participate in their new government.178
Iraq’s control of force and stability were also greatly strained due to the violence of the
insurgency and subsequent civil war. The invasion had incapacitated Iraq’s infrastructure, while
Bremer’s CPA had eliminated a large portion of Iraq’s existing political infrastructure. This
deadly combination, instead of clearing the way for democracy as the Bush administration had
hoped, only inhibited Iraq’s democratization prospects. After the CPA exited Iraq, the people’s
resentment over the continuing weakness of state institutions and the state’s inability to deliver
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even the most basic services only served to exacerbate the perception of widespread corruption,
ineffectuality, and illegitimacy of government in Iraq. According to research conducted at Johns
Hopkins School of Public Health, up to 700,000 people had been killed between the invasion and
2006 alone.179 The total cost of damage done to Iraq is generally considered to be around $12
billion, but from 2003—2011, the US government spent approximately $61.11 billion attempting
to rebuild civil and military institutions in the state.180 Conditions were so bad, that in 2011 the
UN estimated that only 26 percent of the population was covered by the public sewage network,
and only 25 percent had access to safe drinking water.181 Iraq’s government, plagued by its weak
institutions and damaged infrastructure further inhibited its control of force, its democratic
leadership, and due to the violence from the insurgency, its basic freedoms of person.
In attempting to construct a liberal democracy with the semblance of ethno-religious
based federalism, the United States failed to account for the fact that Iraq lacked a majority of the
Universal Characteristics of Democracy, including basic freedoms of person, the creation of a
legitimate and lasting constitution, inclusive citizenship with the ability to participate politically,
control of force and strong political leadership by an elected official, stability of democratic
institutions, a functional and legitimate party system, justice, and rule of law. Even Robert Gates,
who replaced Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006 and was assigned to the Iraq Study
Group, recognized the errors of implementation that essentially ensured the failure of militarized
democratization. In his memoir he states that “we had simply no idea how broken Iraq was
before the war—economically, socially, culturally, politically, in its infrastructure, the education
system, you name it,” which returns to the idea that not only was the Bush administration’s
implementation of democracy misguided, but that Iraq itself also faced structural obstacles to
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democracy it could not overcome.182 Given the CPA’s destruction of established political
institutions, its failure to include key societal groups, and its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the
Iraqi people due to a top-down implementation strategy, it seems clear that Bush’s ideals of
militarized democracy were incompatible in Iraq in their design, as well as in their
implementation.
In light of the Bush administration’s misunderstandings of Iraq’s historical context, the
destruction of Iraq’s existing political institutions, and the CPA’s complete failure to
successfully implement democratic policies on the ground in Iraq, it is clear that this
democratization project failed. In an exchange between Condoleezza Rice and President Bush on
the day of the CPA’s transfer of power to Iraq (June 28 2004), Rice wrote: “Mr. President, Iraq is
sovereign. Letter was passed from Bremer at 10:26 a.m. Iraq time.” In response, Bush declared:
“Let Freedom Reign!”183 We now know that the foolish optimism of this exchange would not
ring true. In the years following the CPA’s transfer of power back to the Iraqi people, the
necessary characteristics for a successful and legitimate democracy were not met. Bush’s version
of militarized democratization was never compatible with the creation of legitimate democracy
in Iraq to begin with. Thus, it cannot be contested that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” brought
neither freedom nor democracy to Iraq.
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IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS

CONCLUSION
Through a careful examination and analysis of the United States’ democratization efforts
in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, this thesis demonstrates that due to an inadequate
understanding of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s historical, political, and social
contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to democracy, the Clinton and
Bush administrations failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq. The United States
assumed it could impose a liberal democracy upon the existing conditions in Haiti and Iraq,
failing to account for implicit, internal characteristics that were unfavorable to democracy itself.
Furthermore, despite the obstacles to democracy encountered in each country, the Clinton and
Bush administrations assumed that exporting democracy would not only be easy, but that it
would be welcomed in each country. Finally, US policy makers viewed constructing elections in
each country as equivalent to democracy, revealing a lack of understanding of the fundamental
characteristics of democracy. Together, these cases suggest that the very practice of exporting
democracy through military intervention alone cannot lead to sustainable democracy.
While many studies of democratization have been attempted by scholars in the field to
understand how and why democracies flourish or fail, the research conducted for this project is
distinct in that it relied on prominent democracy scholars to provide identifiable characteristics
of democracy and then utilized these characteristics to analyze the military invasions and
subsequent democratization attempts through military interventions in Haiti and Iraq. This was
done in order to ask the question of where and why U.S. democracy planners went wrong in their
efforts to export democracy to Haiti and Iraq. With the exception of Arend Lijphart, all of the
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democratization scholars consulted (chosen due to their significance in the field and frequency of
citation) showed a commitment to liberal, individual democracies characterized by free, fair and
frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the creation of a lasting and
legitimate constitution, an autonomous civil society, legitimate political parties, and the rule of
law, to name a few.
Utilizing multiple sources to gain a complete understanding of democracy, I developed
three categories against which I analyzed the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti
and Iraq: Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of
Democracy, and Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization. Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy contains characteristics implicit to a country’s unique social,
political, and economic contexts. It recognizes each country’s existing conditions and how these
conditions can affect differently the possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization
that result from these traits. This category’s associated characteristics are:
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY:
Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)
Homogenous society (Dahl)
Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)
Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)
Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)
Urbanization levels (Lipset)
Education levels (Lipset
Economic success (Lipset)
Strength of civil society (Putnam)
Universal Characteristics of Democracy is derived from the qualifications for democracy that
rely on democratic scholars’ understanding of democracy as independent from how it relates to a
certain country. The characteristics associated with this category are based on an external,
Western model of what a liberal democracy should look like, as well as on the consensus that
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lasting democratic institutions are necessary for a lasting and functional democracy. This
category’s characteristics are:
UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY
Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)
Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)
Alternative sources of information (Dahl)
Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)
Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)
Strong political leadership (Huntington)
Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)
Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)
Legitimate political parties (Lipset)
Justice and rule of law (Lipset)
Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)
Finally, the category Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization contains characteristics that
are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, as well as on universal
characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. The characteristics are
not simply the opposites of what we desire in a democracy, they are obstacles that democracy
planners must account for, work to mitigate, and anticipate. This category’s characteristics are:
OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)
Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)
Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)
Poverty (Huntington)
Lack of stability (Huntington)
Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)
Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)
Militarized democratization (Zakaria)
Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)
Misdirected international funding (Carothers)
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Together, these three categories and the characteristics distinguished in each one, help us to
understand more clearly why the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq ended
in failure.
The Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an insufficient
time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in Haiti during
and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a successful and stable
democracy. Before the intervention, Haiti contained almost none of the Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy. Due to Haiti’s political past of violent coups and corrupt dictators,
Haiti neither developed a democratic political culture, nor did its government achieve legitimacy
in the eyes of Haiti’s citizens. Additionally, Haiti, as the poorest nation in the Western
hemisphere, did not have the economic characteristics associated with successful democracies.
Haiti’s poverty contributed to its low levels of education and urbanization, neither of which were
optimal for democratization in 1994 when the United States intervened. The Obstacles to
Democracy and Democratization that the United States faced were numerous as well: by placing
economic embargoes on Haiti, the Clinton administration exacerbated Haiti’s levels of poverty,
violence, and disease, thus contributing to the refugee crisis. When the decision was finally made
to pursue democratization in Haiti, the Clinton administration, due to domestic pressures,
designed a mission that was insufficient in time and scope for the creation of lasting democratic
institutions. It viewed conducting elections as the final step in democratization, ignoring other
important aspects of democracy. Finally, when evaluating Haiti’s democracy by the Universal
Characteristics of Democracy, in the aftermath of the intervention, we find that Haiti’s lack of
security and control of force inhibited civil society’s freedom of expression and ability to
participate politically. Furthermore, its absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law
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extremely difficult, undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. The Haiti case
demonstrates that while the Clinton administration constructed opportunities for elections,
created programs for reforming the security forces, and funneled money into reviving Haiti’s
economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying political, economic, and social contexts,
fundamentally misunderstood the necessary characteristics required for a stable and legitimate
democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti before democracy could be sustained.
Due to an inadequate understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a
misguided implementation strategy, and a disregard for the hastily constructed democratic
institutions in the state itself, the Bush administration again failed to successfully export
democracy to Iraq. Like Haiti, Iraq did not contain many of the Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy prior to the United States’ invasion. Its autocratic governments
traditionally flattened any civil society organizations or political participation deemed a threat to
the existing regime, signifying a lack of democratic culture and legitimacy of government in the
eyes of Iraq’s people. While Iraq’s economy had faired better than Haiti’s due to its oil
resources, the economic sanctions placed on the country in light of the Gulf War eventually
decimated its economy and contributed to Iraq’s levels of poverty, starvation, and violence. Iraq
also has a divided society, which is significant for the study of democratization as sectarian
tension further inhibits democracy. Furthermore, Bush created and faced various Obstacles to
Democracy and Democratization in Iraq, most of which were due to his administration’s
misconceptions of Iraq as well as to the damaging actions of the CPA. Bush’s view of Iraq as the
catalyst for his plans to democratize the Middle East failed to acknowledge Iraq’s unique social,
political, and economic contexts, thus contributing to the poor planning of democratization after
the invasion. The CPA’s actions de-legitimized the Iraqi government, increased divides within
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society, dramatically increased the levels of violence within the state, and viewed elections as the
end-all be-all in its democratization efforts. The CPA failed to achieve a nuanced understanding
of democracy and its requirements. Finally, in the aftermath of the CPA, Iraq cannot be
categorized as having achieved a functional, stable, and legitimate democracy when analyzed
according to the Universal Characteristics of Democracy. The Iraqi people did not truly control
their democratization process or the construction of their constitution, and therefore the
government was not seen as legitimate. This lack of legitimacy coupled with sectarian conflict
contributed to the instability and violence within the state. Additionally, the dissolution of the
Iraqi Army left a security vacuum and aggravated the insurgency. Due to the violence and
instability it exacerbated, the ensuing civil war then inhibited freedom of expression and political
participation. The Iraq case demonstrates that while the Bush administration removed Saddam
Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities for democratic
elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context coupled with the
United States’ militaristic destruction of the country’s existing institutions only led to an
unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.

COMPARATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF HAITI AND IRAQ
Now that we have achieved an understanding of the Haiti and Iraq cases as they relate to
the identified characteristics of democracy, engaging in a comparison between the two allows us
to consider militarized democratization as a tool of U.S. foreign policy in a larger sense. We can
ask the question: after comparing failed U.S. democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, what
insights on democracy and militarized democratization can we now take away? On the surface,
the Haiti and Iraq appear to have very little in common: they are different geographically,
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economically, politically, socially, and religiously. Together, however, they represent two U.S.
democratization efforts that functioned as the foreign policy centerpieces for Presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush in a post-Cold War world. Their comparison is useful if we are to
further contextualize and understand why each state’s U.S.-instigated, fledgling democracies
eventually collapsed. After delving into the intricacies of these interventions, and their ensuing
failures in chapters two and three, we can now look at the distinct and important ways in which
the two cases are similar, and the ways in which they are not, and why both administrations
failed in their attempts to export democratic change militarily.
Both cases were marked by harsh economic sanctions, military engagement, the
dismantling of key institutions, and the assumption that through the conduction of elections,
democracy would flourish in both Haiti and Iraq. Before each democratization effort, the United
States, in concert with the United Nations, placed economic sanctions and embargoes on Haiti
and Iraq that ended up crippling each state’s economy, as well as aggravating the humanitarian
crises (levels of poverty, violence, famine, and disease) that were already considered severe. The
Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that through these policies, the Cédras and Hussein
regimes would simply comply with the United States’ demands. We now know that these
calculations proved devastating not to the elite members of the regimes as they were intended,
but to the ranks of the middle and lower classes within each state, as well as to the state’s
economic, transit, and communications infrastructures. Thus, before even attempting to create
institutions of democratic governance, the United States damaged Haiti and Iraq so severely that
it negatively impacted the democratization efforts post-invasion. Furthermore, during both
Clinton and Bush’s pre-invasion planning, both administrations assumed that invading Haiti and
Iraq on the basis of democratization would not only be welcomed, but that it would be a
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relatively easy endeavor. Democracies, however, require more than fifteen months to build.
Thus, despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s rhetorical commitments to democracy in
Haiti and Iraq, each administration’s policy makers designed a mission that was insufficient in
time and scope, setting up the trappings of democracy in each country, but failing to create and
strengthen the key institutions and practices necessary for a successful, legitimate, and stable
government.
The Clinton and Bush administrations approached the construction of democracy in Haiti
and Iraq with the assumption that by the simple removal or addition of institutions, leaders, and
organizations, democratization would smoothly run its course. On one hand, this is evidenced by
Clinton’s treatment of Aristide as the primary solution to democracy in Haiti, and on the other
hand, through Bush’s treatment of Saddam and his regime as the fundamental obstacle to
democracy in Haiti. While the addition and subtraction of core political leaders did indeed
influence the development of each country’s governance, viewing Aristide and Hussein in this
absolute way prevented the other important characteristics of democracy, such as civil society’s
right to associational autonomy, basic freedoms of person, legitimate political parties, rule of
law, or control of force by an elected official, to be fully realized. For example, both
administrations enacted policy measures that destroyed aspects of Haiti and Iraq’s existing
security forces, which ultimately led to the populations of each state facing daily violence, a
general instability of state and government, and the inability by citizens to fully participate in the
democratic process. Iraq, as we know, had its institutions stripped by the CPA in a way that more
severely damaged its democratization prospects than the actions taken by the UN coalition in
Haiti.
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Finally, the most distinct and important way in which the U.S. democratization efforts in
Haiti and Iraq reflect similar failures of military intervention is the notion that for each attempt,
the Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that with the advent of elections, democracy had
been achieved. We now know, however, that the characteristics of a successful democracy
extend far beyond constructing free, fair, and frequent elections. That is not to say that elections
are not vital in a democratic society, but that other characteristics of democratic governance (a
vibrant civil society, personal freedom and liberty, a legitimate and lasting constitution, strong
political leadership and control of force, and legitimate political parties) are of equal importance
as well. It is easy to define democracy through an election, because elections are relatively easy
to measure. However, when policy makers prioritize elections over every other aspect of
democracy, attempts at democratization will not be successful in the long-term. As we also noted
in these cases, there were U.S. domestic election concerns that truncated democratization efforts
in Haiti and Iraq, and thus sped up the timetable for democratic elections in each country. When
a timelines for democratization efforts are shortened, it is seen by our democratization scholars
as an obstacle to democracy. Presidents Bush and Clinton declared democracy and freedom in
Haiti and Iraq upon the conduction of elections in part because they needed to show the world
(and their constituencies) that the United States had won itself a victory.
While the similarities between these two failed democratization efforts reveal important
patterns for future policy makers, should the United States again attempt to democratize a
foreign country, it is necessary to illuminate the ways in which these two cases are different as
well. First and foremost, Clinton’s invasion of Haiti exhibited multilateral engagement with the
approval of the United Nations, whereas Bush’s invasion of Iraq was only supported largely by
the United States itself, and secondarily by Britain—it is an example of unilateral action seen in
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Bush’s preemptive national security strategy. While neither of these cases were completely
supported by the world or by the United States, this international context is important to consider
because it can lend or detract legitimacy from the military engagement, and if we can recall,
legitimacy is universally considered an important characteristic of democracy.
Additionally, the conditions in each country prior to invasion were different. Iraq, for
example, is divided along sectarian lines in a way that Haiti is not. Haiti, however, had a poor
economic situation even before the United States placed embargoes on the state whereas Iraq’s
economic status pre-sanctions was relatively strong. It is critical to remember and acknowledge
these differences, because although these cases allow for a powerful comparison of the mistakes
made by US policy makers in their democratization efforts, the results of each attempt are not
exactly the same. Treating them as such would diminish the unique conditions and structural
limitations in Haiti and Iraq that impacted each country’s failure to democratize. It is evident,
however, that neither “Operation Uphold Democracy” nor “Operation Iraqi Freedom”
established democracy in Haiti and Iraq.
As we have seen, between the U.S. policy makers’ mistakes throughout “Operation
Uphold Democracy” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in Haiti and Iraq, we can draw important
conclusions about the nature of democratization attempts through the use of military intervention
after the end of the Cold War. It remains apparent that if policy makers do not pay attention to
the internal and external characteristics necessary for a sustainable democracy, and the obstacles
to democratization that occur along the way, we cannot expect future military endeavors to be
successful. While this thesis focuses on examining explicit failures in the United States’ postCold War history of promoting and exporting democracy around the world, it does not suggest
that we rule out supporting democratizing initiatives entirely. It does contend, however, that we
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must examine carefully the ways in which we must modify our democratization practices if the
U.S. hopes to promote democratization abroad. Yes, the Haiti and Iraq cases demonstrate that
militarized democratization alone is not viable. Nevertheless, these cases do not signify that
other forms of support for democracy should be ruled out. To identify which forms of support
would lead to successful democratization, however, requires further research. One thing remains
clear: if democratization is to occur successfully, it will not be on the back of a tank.
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APPENDIX 1: ANALYTIC CATEGORIES AND THEIR CRITERIA
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS
ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY

-Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)
-Homogenous society (Dahl)
-Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)
-Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and
Stepan)
-Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)
-Urbanization levels (Lipset)
-Education levels (Lipset
-Economic success (Lipset)
-Strength of civil society (Putnam)

UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DEMOCRACY

-Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)
-Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)
-Alternative sources of information (Dahl)
-Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically
(Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
-Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)
-Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)
-Strong political leadership (Huntington)
-Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and
Stepan)
-Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz
and Stepan)
-Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
-Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)
-Legitimate political parties (Lipset)
-Justice and rule of law (Lipset)
-Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)

OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION

-Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)
-Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)
-Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)
-Poverty (Huntington)
-Lack of stability (Huntington)
-Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)
-Viewing the election as the final step in democratization
(Zakaria)
-Militarized democratization (Zakaria)
-Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic
institutions (Whitehead)
-Misdirected international funding (Carothers)
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